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This article-a sequel to Professor Wildenthal's article The Lost Compromise
in the previous issue of the Ohio State Law Journal-analyzes the early
understanding in the Supreme Court, from 1880 to 1908, regarding incorporation
of the Bill ofRights in the Fourteenth Amendment. Professor Wildenthal offers a
fresh and comprehensive analysis of all the relevant cases, with special attention
to the briefs and arguments presented to the Court, a resource previously
underused by scholars. The article demonstrates that the incorporationist reading
of the 1873 Slaughter-House Cases (discussed in Professor Wildenthal's previous
article) reverberated in the first extensive pro-incorporation argument presented
to the Court, by John Randolph Tucker in Spies v. llinois (1887). That
unconventional reading of Slaughter-House also played a role in the dissents by
three Justices who embraced the incorporation theory in O'Neil v. Vermont
(1892). Professor Wildenthal details the treatment of that theory up through the
Court's historic decision in Twining v. New Jersey (1908), which embraced a
theory of total disincorporation. He shows how this early case law has been
profoundly misunderstood by earlier scholars, notably by Professor Stanley
Morrison in a 1949 Stanford Law Review article (the companion to Professor
Charles Fairman 'sfamous analysis of the original understanding of the Fourteenth
Amendment). In particular, Professor Wildenthal defends the first Justice John
Marshall Harlan 's historic and critical role in these cases. The article concludes
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by surveying the Court's modern treatment of the incorporation theory, and by
noting the recent revival ofthe Fourteenth Amendment Privileges and Immunities
Clause in Saenz v. Roe (1999). Professor Wildenthal argues that the evidence
analyzed in articles shouldplace the incorporation theory on a strongerfoundation
as the Courtfaces a new century.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUC ION ................................................................................... 1459
II. THE 1880s ........................................................................................... 1463
A. Justice Harlan's Arrival on the Scene ........................................ 1463
B. Hurtado and the Grand Jury Problem ....................................... 1469
C. Slaughter-House Revisited and Presser ...................................... 1480
D. John Randolph Tucker and the Spies Appeal ............................ 1484
III. THE 1890s ........................................................................................... 1493
A. The Crossroads of O'Neil ........................................................... 1494
B. The Curious Exception of Chicago B&Q .................................. 1501
IV. THE DAWN OF A NEW CENTURY AND THE END OF AN
AULD SANG: MAXWELL, PATTERSON, AND TWINING .......................... 1505
V. THE BEGINNiNGS OF A NEW SONG:
1947,1969,1999, AND BEYOND ....................................................... 1515
[Vol. 61:14571458
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The Fourteenth Amendment... provides that "no State shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States .... "
What are the privileges and immunities of "citizens of the United
States"? Without attempting to enumerate them, it ought to be deemed
safe to say that such privileges and immunities embrace at least those
expressly recognized by the Constitution of the United States and placed
beyond the power of Congress to take away or impair.1
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1908, in Twiningv. New Jersey,2 a majority of the Justices of the Supreme
Court; over the dissent of the first Justice John Marshall Harlan, conceded that their
predecessors had given "much less effect to the Fourteenth Amendment than some
of the public men active in framing it intended."3 "But," they said, "we need not
now inquire into the merits of the original dispute.... The distinction between
national and state citizenship and their respective privileges [previously] drawn has
come to be firmly established." 4 The majority was referring to the scope of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 5 They conceded
that the "view [that this clause incorporates the Bill of Rights] has been, at different
times, expressed by justices of this court... and was undoubtedly... entertained
by some of those who framed the Amendment.' 6 They rejected the idea, however,
concluding that it was "not profitable to examine the weighty arguments in its favor,
for the question is no longer open in this court."7
The Twining Court was discussing the Great Debate over "incorporation," or
whether and to what extent the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the states the
guarantees of the federal Bill of Rights.8 In a recent article in this journal, this
author began the task of "revisit[ing] th[at] most durable and ceaselessly
1 Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 606 (1900) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
2 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
3 1 at 96.
4Id.
5 "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States .... " U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
6 Twining, 211 U.S. at 98.
7Id.
8 U.S. CONST. amends. I-VIII, XIV.
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provocative controversy in American constitutional law."9 That article explored the
early post-ratification understanding on incorporation during the period from 1868
to 1880, looking to the opinions of the Supreme Court; the briefs and arguments by
lawyers before the Court, and-most dramatically-key debates in Congress. It
demonstrated that more than a century of conventional wisdom on the early
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment must be overtumed. 1°
The Court's decision in the Slaughter-House Cases of 187311 has
conventionally been viewed as rejecting incorporation and gutting the Privileges
and Immunities Clause.12 In fact, total incorporation via the Privileges and
Immunities Clause may well have been embraced by all nine Justices in Slaughter-
House, including Justice Samuel F. Miller's majority opinion.13 This author's
previous article, building upon the work of prior scholars, showed how this theory
is supported by a careful reading of Justice Miller's opinion itself. It also explored
more thoroughly than previous scholarship the implications of carefully reading all
three Slaughter-House dissents, so as to better understand the overall dialectic of
9 Bryan H. Wildenthal, The Lost Compromise: Reassessing the Early Understanding in
Court and Congress on Incorporation of the Bill ofRights in the Fourteenth Amendment, 61 01O
ST. L.J. 1051, 1054 [hereinafter Wildenthal, Lost Compromise].
10 See generally id
11 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
12 See, e.g., GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 421,431
(13th ed. 1997); AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCION 212-
13 (1998) [hereinafter AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS]; MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL
ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 175 (1986) [hereinafter
CURTIs, No STATE]; Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill ofRights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101
YALE L.J. 1193, 1258 (1992) [hereinafter Amar]; Richard L. Aynes, Constricting the Law of
Freedom: Justice Miller, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Slaughter-House Cases, 70
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 627, 653-55 (1994) [hereinafter Aynes, Miller]; Michael Kent Curtis,
Resurrecting the Privileges or Immunities Clause and Revising the Slaughter-House Cases
Without Exhuming Lochner: IndividualRights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 38 B.C. L. REV.
1, 71 n.249, 86 (1996) [hereinafter Curtis, Resurrecting].
13 See 2 WELLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLrICS AND THE CONSrIIUTION IN THE HISTORY
OF THE UNITED STATES 1128-30 (1953) [hereinafter CROSSKEY, POLITICS]; JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUsT: A THEORY OF JUDICiAL REVIEW 196-97 n.59 (1980); Robert C.
Palmer, The Parameters of Constitutional Reconstruction: Slaughter-House, Cruikshank, and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 739; Kevin Christopher Newson, Setting
Incorporationism Straight: A Reinterpretation of the Slaughter-House Cases, 109 YALE LJ. 643
(2000); Wildenthal, Lost Compromise, supra note 9; see also Laurence H. Tribe, The Supreme
Court, 1998 Term: Comment-Saenz Sans Prophecy: Does the Privileges or Immunities Revival
Portend the Future-or Reveal the Structure of the Present?, 113 HARV. L. REV. 110, 182-84 &
nn.326, 331 (1999) [hereinafter Tribe, Saenz] (citing Newsom's then-forthcoming article);
1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrm ONAL LAW § 7-3, at 1307 (3d ed. 2000) [vol. 1
hereinafter TRIBE 2000; vol. 2 is not yet published] (citing Ely and Palmer).
1460 [Vol 61:1457
ROAD TO TWINING
the decision.14 The article's other major new contributions to the scholarship were
to demonstrate the further support for this theory to be found in the Slaughter-
House briefs,15 and in the fact that Slaughter-House was contemporaneously read
in an incorporationist light by members of Congress across the political spectrum
in 1873-74.16
Indeed, for a brief time in the early 1870s, incorporation appears to have been
accepted as a minimum consensus reading of both the Fourteenth Amendment and
Slaughter-House-a reading embraced alike by Democrats and Republicans,
Southerners and Northerners, reactionaries and radicals. 17 That potential consensus,
however, was undermined and seemingly rejected by the Supreme Court in a series
of decisions from 1874 to 1880:18 Edwards v. Elliott,19 Walker v. Sauvinet,20
United States v. Cruikshank,21 Davidson v. New Orleans,22 and Missouri v.
Lewis.23
This article takes up the early understanding on incorporation after 1880. It
revisits the process of argument briefing, and decisionmaking in the Supreme Court
by which the majority's conclusion in Twining, emphatically rejecting
incorporation, "c[a]me to be firmly established."24 Like the previous article, it
reassesses a history that has been profoundly misunderstood. Also like its
predecessor, it does so in part by resorting to careful examination of the briefs and
arguments by lawyers before the Court, a resource previously underused by
scholars.25
In particular, this article seeks to correct the errors and misinterpretations of the
prior leading scholarly account of this case law, Professor Stanley Morrison's 1949
Stanford Law Review article.2 6 That article, along with its famous companion article
14 See Wildenthal, Lost Compromise, supra note 9, at Parts II.C-E.
15 See id. at Part I.D.
16 Seeid. at Part ll.A.1.
17 See id. at Parts IIA and IIIA.1.
18 See id. at Parts III.A.4-IV.
19 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 532 (1874).
20 92 U.S. 90 (1876).
21 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
22 96 U.S. 97 (1878).
23 101 U.S. 22 (1880).
24 Twining, 211 U.S. at 96.
2 5 See Wildenthal, Lost Compromise, supra note 9, at 1066 n.54.
26Stanley Morrison, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill ofRights? The
Judicial Interpretation, 2 STAN. L. REV. 140 (1949).
2000] 1461
OHIO STATE LA WJOURTAL
by Professor Charles Faima, 27 responded to Justice Hugo L. Black's 1947 dissent
in Adamson v. Califomia28 by attacking incorporation as a radical "afterthought" 2 9
As summarized in this author's previous article, Fairman's account of the original
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment during its framing and ratification in
1866-68 has been thoroughly discredited by scholars such as Professor William
Winslow Crosskey, Professor Michael Kent Curtis, Professor Akhil Reed Amar,
and Dean Richard Aynes.30
The previous article began the task of examining and refuting Professor
Morrison's account of the post-ratification understanding and judicial interpretation
of the Fourteenth Amendment.3 ' This article completes that task. In so doing, it also
builds upon and cements the modem scholarly repudiation of Fairman's thesis.32
It should place the incorporation theory on a stronger foundation in the modem
Supreme Court, which recently signalled, in Saenz v. Roe,33 a willingness to
reexamine the Privileges and Immunities Clause after its near-total dormancy
during the first 130 years of the Amendment's history. Let the story now continue.
27 Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill ofRights? The
Or inal Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REv. 5 (1949).
28 332 U.S. 46, 68-123 (1947) (Black, J.,joined by Douglas, J., dissenting); see also id. at
123-25 (Murphy, J., joined by Rutledge, J., dissenting).
2 9 See Morrison, supra note 26, at 152; see also id at 143-57; Fairman, supra note 27, at 5-
6, 134-39.
3 0 See Wildenthal, Lost Compromise, supra note 9, at Part I.B. The key stages in the
scholarly demolition of Fairman's thesis were Crosskey's unjustly underrated and long-ignored
1954 article, see William Winslow Crosskey, Charles Fairman, 'Legislative History, " and the
ConstitutionalLimitations on State Authority, 22 U. Cm. L. REV. 1, 2-119 (1954) [hereinafter
Crosskey], Curtis's 1986 book (the most important work on the subject, which synthesized a series
of his articles beginning in 1980), see CURTIS, No STATE, supra note 12, Amar's 1992 article, see
Amar, supra note 12, and Aynes's 1993 article, see Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John
Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, 103 YALE LJ. 57 (1993) [hereinafter Aynes, Bingham].
31 See, e.g., Wildenthal, Lost Compromise, supra note 9, at Part IA (summarizing key errors
in Morrison's article); id. at Part El.D (criticizing Morrison's treatment of Slaughter-House).
32 See, e.g., infra Part ll.B (discussing Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884), and
problems raised by issue of incorporating right to grand jury indictment); infra Part V
(summarizing overall conclusions to be drawn from evidence analyzed in this article and its
predecessor).
33 526 U.S. 489 (1999); see also Wildenthal, Lost Compromise, supra note 9, at Part IA;
infra Part V.
1462 [Vol. 61:1457
ROAD TO YTVNING1
II. THE 1880s
Looking... to the purpose in view in adopting this Fourteenth
Amendment, and to the historic condition of things which suggested
it... I cannot think that we can go wrong in holding, as a canon for its
true construction, that it shall have a liberal interpretation in favor of
personal rights and liberty. If the views of the minority of the court in the
Slaughter-House Cases be adopted, the argument I shall present would
only be the stronger, but I shall rest upon that of the majority .... 34
A. Justice Harlan's Arrival on the Scene
The first case after 1880 to implicate the issue of incorporation was Hurtado
v. California,35 which provoked one of Justice John Marshall Harlan's many
impassioned dissents.36 Hurtado was the first battle in Harlan's campaign-which
lasted through almost all of his thirty-four-year tenure on the Court, from 1877 to
1911 37-to restore the incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth
Amendment. He inevitably dominates this article's narrative.
Justice Harlan is most famous, of course, for his legendary dissent in Plessy v.
Ferguson,38 protesting the Court's upholding of state-mandated racial segregation
in transportation. That his progressive vision of the law extended much farther has
not always been fully appreciated. Any general study of his legal philosophy would
outrun the scope of this article. But his contribution to the incorporation issue
should be placed in the context of his overall judicial career and approach to the
law.
After a long drought of writing on Harlan's life, two excellent general
biographies finally appeared in the 1990s.3 9 The most insightful study of his legal
philosophy, however, is Professor Linda Przybyszewski's book, The Republic
According to John Marshall Harlan.40 Harlan adopted the Republican Party as his
34 Spies v. Illinois, 123 U.S. 131, 150 (1887) (argument of John Randolph Tucker) (citation
omitted).
35 110 US. 516 (1884).
36 Id at 538-58 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
37 See THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 968
(Kermit L. Hall ed. 1992) [hereinafter OXFORD SUPREME COURT] (table of Justices and their
tenures).
38 163 U.S. 537, 552-64 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
39 LoREN P. BETH, JOHNMARsHALL HARLAN: THELAsTWHIGJUSICE(1992); TNSLEYE.
YARBRoUGH, JUDICIAL ENIGMA: THE FIRST JUSTICE HARLAN (1995).
40 LNDAPRzYBYsvsi, THE REPUBLIC ACCORDING TO JONMARSHALLHARLAN (1999)
[hereinafter PRZYBYSZEWSKI]. Przybyszewski's study actually predates Beth's and Yarbrough's
books, see supra note 39, originating as a 1989 Ph.D. dissertation. See Linda CA. Przybyszewsld,
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political affiliation after the Civil War, but more important to his judicial career was
his commitment to an idealized vision of civic republicanism. This philosophy
involved, for Harlan, a strong belief in equal opportunity, individual liberty and a
corresponding work ethic, vigorous citizen participation in democratic institutions,
and a deep aversion to the arrogance and injustice of unearned privilege, whether
claimed by European aristocrats or American White supremacists.41
A lawyer and politician from Kentucky, Harlan and his family owned slaves,
and although he was a staunch Unionist during the Civil War, he strongly opposed
emancipation and-most ironically-the very Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments he would spend much of his judicial career defending. 42 That he was
able to travel from such a background to his stirring 1896 evocation in Plessy of a
"color-blind" Constitution under which "all citizens are equal before the law ''43 is
part of his enduring mystique. Praising Harlan's Plessy dissent has become a
cliche-and attention should be paid to its troubling aspects44 -but it has
deservedly become one of the canonical documents of American political and legal
mythology, on a par with Jefferson's Declaration of Independence, Lincoln's
Gettysburg Address, and the Constitution itself.
At its best, Harlan's writing achieved poetic eloquence, not to mention
prophetic insight, as in his comment that "[tihe destinies of the two races, in this
country, are indissolubly linked together, and the interests of both require that the
common government of all shall not permit the seeds of race hate to be planted
under the sanction of law."45 In his avowal that "[t]he humblest [citizen] is the peer
The Republic According to John Harlan Marshall: Race, Republicanism, and Citizenship (Ph.D.
dissertation, Stanford Univ., 1989) [hereinafter Przybyszewski Diss.]. It is one of the most
intriguing and inspiring accounts ever written on the formation and expression of any judge's legal
philosophy and work product. And Harlan, of course, was not just any judge, but ajudicial giant
whose life spanned, in storybook fashion, some of the most wrenching and formative aspects and
years of American life and history. Given such praise and the coincidence that Professor
Przybyszewski and I received degrees from the same university in the same year, it is perhaps
appropriate to add that I have never met her. I originally cited only Przybyszewsd's dissertation
because I completed much of this article before the publication of her book. Because the book
substantially modifies the dissertation in certain ways, I now cite to both the book and the
dissertation, as appropriate.
41 See PRZYBYSZEWSKI, supra note 40, at 81-117, 185-202; Przybyszewski Diss., supra
note 40, at 77-88, 311-22.
4 2 See BETH, supra note 39, at 25-80; YARBROUGH, supra note 39, at 3-64;
PRzYBYszEWsKI, note 40, at 14-43; Przybyszewski Diss., supra note 40, at 1-52.
43 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
44 See infra note 58.
4 5 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 560 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
1464 [Vol. 61:1457
ROAD TO TWINING
of the most powerful," and that "[t]he law regards man as man,"46 can be heard the
echo of the Scottish bard of democracy:
Is there, for honest poverty, [a man] That hangs his head, and a' that?... What though
on hamely fare we dine, Wear hodden gray, and a' that; Gie fools their silks, and knaves
their wine, A man's a man for a' that! ... Ye see yon birlde, ca'd a lord, Wha struts, and
stares, and a' that; ... The man of independent mind, He looks and laughs at a'
that! ... For a' that, and a' that, It's comin' yet for a' that, That man to man, the warld
o'er, Shall brothers be for a' that!47
An intriguing personal angle is added by evidence that, indeed, Justice Harlan
had an African-American half-brother, Robert James Harlan. As a slave, Robert
Harlan grew up and was educated (illegally at the time) in the Harlan household. He
made his fortune in the California gold fields and purchased his freedom. After the
Civil War, he became a prominent Ohio Republican with whom Justice Harlan
maintained cordial communications, although their relationship was never publicly
acknowledged.48
46 Id at 559.
4 7 ROBERT BURNS, Is There, For Honest Poverty (1795), in THE COMPLETE POEticAL
WORKS OF ROBERT BURNS 482-83 (Edinburgh: W.P. Nimmo, 1878). Unfortunately, in Bums's
and Harlan's time, the law also regarded woman as woman. See, eg., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 130, 139-42 (1873) (Bradley, J., joined by Swayne and Field, JJ., concurring in the
judgment) (agreeing, in remarkably patemalistic terms, with denial of woman's claim of admission
to practice of law); PRZYBYSZEWSKI, supra note 40, at 187 (noting Harlan's lack of sympathy for
women's access to legal profession). Equality under the law without regard to sex (or, for
example, sexual orientation) lay beyond even Harlan's far-seeing vision, though not beyond the
full sweep of the principles he articulated. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996)
(invoking Harlan's Plessy dissent, two days after its one hundredth anniversary, to open first
Supreme Court majority opinion ever to strike down, under Equal Protection Clause, mistreatment
of gay and lesbian people).
48 See BErH, supra note 39, at 12-13 (noting uncertainty whether Robert's father was Justice
Harlan's father or grandfather, Robert's mother, Mary Harlan, was a slave belonging to the
Harlans; Robert eventually settled in Cincinnati and became active in Republican politics,
including service in the Ohio legislature); YARBROUGH, supra note 39, at 10-11 (evidence
supports conclusion that Robert and Justice Harlan were half-brothers); id. at 11-20, 141
(describing Robert's life, career, and contacts with Harlan and his family, including an 1871
incident involving an assault by a White Harlan relative on a Black justice of the peace in
Washington, D.C., in which the future Justice Harlan enlisted Robert's assistance in handling the
delicate racial issues involved); see also PRZYBYSZEwSKI, supra note 40, at 23-24, 112-13;
Przybyszewski Diss., supra note 40, at 21-23; James Gordon, Did the First Justice Harlan Have
a Black Brother?, 15 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 159 (1993). Among the acquaintances Robert and
Justice Harlan shared were African-American leader Frederick Douglass and future President
William Howard Taft; the latter grew up on the same Cincinnati street where Robert lived and was
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As early as 1883, Justice Harlan was dissenting alone, in a scathing opinion,
from the Court's decision strilcing down the Civil Rights Act of 1875 and its
mandate of racially integrated public accommodations.4 9 Near the end of his career,
in 1908, he assailed with undiminished passion his home state's enforcement of
racial apartheid in private education. 50 In that and other racially charged cases, he
remained, in his seventies, more progressive than such younger, Northern, and
reputedly liberal twentieth-century colleagues as Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr.51
Harlan's vision of freedom and equal rights extended to Native Americans,52
to sailors protesting archaic maritime laws holding them in virtual bondage,53 and
a boyhood schoolmate of Robert's son, Robert Harlan, Jr., who became a lawyer and a lifelong
supporter and correspondent of Taft. See YARBROUGH, supra note 39, at 14-17, 141-42.
4 9 See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3,26-62 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
5 0 See Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 58-70 (1908) (Harlan, J., dissenting). As
Harlan poignantly asked:
Have we become so inoculated with prejudice of race that an American govemment, professedly
based on the principles of freedom, and charged with the protection of all citizens alike, can make
distinctions between such citizens in the matter of their voluntary meeting for innocent purposes
simply because of their respective races?
Id. at 69.
51 See, e.g., Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 493-504 (1903) (Harlan, J., dissenting from
decision finding federal courts powerless to remedy massive disfranchisement of African-
American voters in Alabama); Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207,222-23 (1905) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting alone from majority's reversal of conviction for returning African-Americans to
peonage); Bailey v. Alabama, 211 U.S. 452, 455-59 (1908) [hereinafter Bailey I] (Harlan, J.,
dissenting from Court's refusal on jurisdictional grounds to grant relief to victim of peonage);
Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911) [hereinafterBaileyl1] (Harlan, J.,joining decision finally
granting relief to same litigant as in Bailey I). Holmes concurred in the judgment (without opinion)
in Berea College, 211 U.S. at 58, joined the majority opinion in Clyatt, wrote the Court's opinions
in Giles and Bailey , and wrote an appallingly insensitive dissent in Bailey I, see 219 U.S. at 245-
50 (Holmes, J., joined by Lurton, J., dissenting).
52 See Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 110-23 (1884) (Harlan, J., joined by Woods, J.,
dissenting) (protesting majority's denial of U.S. citizenship and voting rights to Native American
born in U.S. who had left his tribe and settled in Omaha, Nebraska, pointing out that majority's
reasoning created "a despised and rejected class of persons, with no nationality whatever");
PRZYBYSZEWSKI, supra note 40, 118-20 (discussing Elk and Harlan's sympathy for Native
Americans, but also noting that Harlan "shared racial myth that Native Americans were a doomed
people").
53 See Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 288-303 (1897) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(vehemently protesting, as violation of Thirteenth Amendment's ban on slavery and involuntary
servitude, majority's upholding of federal statutes under which sailors in private employment who
'jumped ship" prior to expiration of their contracts of service could be arrested and incarcerated
pending ship's sailing, and forcibly returned to service aboard ship, with no trial or hearing).
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to the peoples of conquered overseas territories claiming that "the Constitution
follow[s] the flag."54 He also took a broad view of federal and state authority to
enact progressive social and economic reforms, dissenting from the more egregious
applications of substantive due process,55 from the Court's invalidation of the
federal income tax,56 and from the Court's weakening, as he saw it, of the scope
and rigor of federal antitrust laws.57
54 PRzYBYSzvSKI, supra note 40, at 137; see also, e.g., Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244,
375-91 (1901) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197,226-49 (1903) (Harlan,
J., dissenting) (protesting majority's refusal to enforce unqualified federal constitutional right to
jury trial in then-territory of Hawaii); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 154-58 (1904) (Harlan,
J., dissenting) (same as to Philippines). In what amounted to a thunderous denunciation of the
theory and practice of colonialism, Justice Harlan declared in Mankichi that, if the majority's
reasoning were taken to its logical conclusion,
the time may not be far distant when, under the exactions of trade and commerce, and to gratify
an ambition to become the dominant political power in all the earth, the United States will acquire
territories in every direction, which are inhabited by human beings, over which territories, to be
called "dependencies" or "outlying possessions," we will exercise absolute dominion, and whose
inhabitants will be regarded as "subjects" or "dependent peoples," to be controlled as Congress
may see fit, not as the Constitution requires, nor as the people governed may wish. Thus will be
engrafted upon our republican institutions, controlled by the supreme law of a written Constitution,
a colonial system entirely foreign to the genius of our government and abhorrent to the principles
that underlie and pervade the Constitution.
Manldchi, 190 U.S. at 240 (Harlan, J., dissenting). See generally PRZYBYSZEWSKI, supra note 40,
at 122-46 (exploring seeming paradox of Harlan's initial support of Spanish-American War and
his opposition to manner in which American colonial rule was extended); Przybyszewski Diss.,
supra note 40, at 251-310 (same).
55 See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45,65-74 (1905) (Harlan, J.,joined by White
and Day, JJ., dissenting from majority's invalidation of state law limiting bakery employment to
ten-hour day and sixty-hour week). Harlan did not, however, reject the theory of substantive due
process. See, e.g., Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (Harlan, J., for the Court) (striking
down federal statutory prohibition of "yellow dog" anti-union railroad employment contracts);
Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898) (Harlan, J., for the Court) (striking down state regulation of
railroad rates); see also YARBROUGH, supra note 39, at 180-82.
5 6 Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 638-86 (1895) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). Harlan's dissent in this case was vindicated by constitutional amendment in 1913,just
two years after his death. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
57 See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 18-46 (1895) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting from majority's conclusion that sugar trust, and manufacturing generally, as allegedly
distinct from interstate commerce, were exempt from Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890); Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 82-106 (1911) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (agreeing with majority's dissolution of monopoly but dissenting from adoption of"rule
of reason" in interpreting Antitrust Act). In his Standard Oil dissent (his last significant opinion),
Harlan commented that "[t]here are some who say that it is a part of one's liberty to conduct
commerce among the States without being subject to governmental authority. But that would not
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Harlan had his inconsistencies and failings. In several important cases, he failed
to rise above the racial attitudes of his time.58 But in so doing, he fell short of a
standard that he alone on that Court had set in the first place. In an oppressively
racist era, it was the magnificent reach of his aspirations, and the extent to which he
did live up to them, that stand out.
be liberty, regulated by law, and liberty, which cannot be regulated by law, is not to be desired."
Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 105 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
58 For example, Justice Harlan wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court in Cumming v.
Richmond County Board ofEducation, 175 U.S. 528 (1899), denying injunctive relief sought by
African-Americans regarding closure of a segregated Black high school in a locality where the
segregated White high school remained open. Procedural quirks enabled Harlan and his colleagues
to dodge, on rather hair-splitting grounds, the fundamental issue of racial segregation in public
education. See PRZYBYSZEXWSK!, supra note 40, at 99-102, 117; Przybyszewski Diss., supra note
40, at 161-69. Earlier, Harlan had silentlyjoined Justice Field's unanimous opinion for the Court
in Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883), upholding a more severe criminal punishment for
adultery when the participants were of different races. Pace was overruled by McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964). See also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); PRZYBYSZEvSKI,
supra note 40, at 109-16; Przybyszewski Diss., supra note 40, at 150-53. An important recent
article has also pointed to Harlan's disturbingly illiberal and anti-egalitarian record (notably worse
in some cases than some of his nineteenth-century colleagues on the Court) in cases affecting
citizens and aliens of Chinese ancestry. See Gabriel I Chin, The Plessy Myth: Justice Harlan and
the Chinese Cases, 82 IOWA L. REV. 151 (1996). Professor Chin, for example, discussed the often-
overlooked language in Harlan's Plessy dissent referring to "a race so different from our own that
we do not permit those belonging to it to become citizens of the United States[:] ... the Chinese
race." Plessy, 163 U.S. at 561 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Compare United States v. Wong Kim Ark,
169 U.S. 649, 652-705 (1898) (holding that Fourteenth Amendment Citizenship Clause applies
to persons bom in United States to Chinese parents), with id. at 705-32 (Fuller, C.J., joined by
Harlan, J., dissenting). See also Chin, supra, at 156-59. More widely noted has been Harlan's
troubling comment in Plessy:
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. And so it is, in prestige, in
achievements, in education, in wealth and in power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all
time, ifit remains irue to its great heritage and holds fast to the principles of constitutional liberty.
Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Professor Przybyszewski argued
that this language, paradoxically, reflected Harlan's ultimate devotion to egalitarian and
meritocratic principles, because it was premised, not on any inherent racial entitlement, but on
adherence to republican principles that themselves, as Harlan promptly spelled out, required
classless equality before the law. "But in view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is
in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our
Constitution is color-blind... [etc.]."Id (emphasis added); see also PRZYBYSzEWSKI, supra note
40, at 95-99; Przybyszewski Diss., supra note 40, at 316-17. There is, regrettably, no similar
salvaging interpretation of Harlan's anti-Chinese stance. I disagree with Professor Chin's
conclusion that Harlan's entire vision of equality under law is consequently discredited, see Chin,
supra, at 156-57, 171-82, but reconciling Harlan's capitulation to racism in the Chinese and other
cases with his overall philosophy and career is a task better left to some future article.
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B. Hurtado and the Grand Jury Problem
The Court's 1884 decision in Hurtado upheld, by a seven-to-one vote, a capital
conviction for murder following prosecution by information rather than grand jury
indictment.59 Justice Stephen J. Field did not participate.60 Joseph Hurtado, the
defendant, invoked neither total incorporation as a broad theory nor the Privileges
and Immunities Clause, 61 presumably because of their poor batting average up to
that time. Nor did he argue that the federal Fifth Amendment grand jury right62 was
literally "incorporated" in the Fourteenth Amendment His argument, instead, was
that forsaking grand jury indictment violated the essential meaning of due process,
which of course is expressly guaranteed by both Amendments.63 In effect, this
amounted to an argument for selective incorporation via the Due Process Clause,
the type of argument that would meet with frequent success by the 1960s.64
Justice Harlan's dissent, foreshadowing his similar protest sixteen years later
in Maxwell v. Dow,65 reflected his special reverence for the institution of the jury
in all its forms.66 His debate with Justice Stanley Matthews, who wrote for the
majority, revolved mainly around the weight to be given to historical English
59 Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516,538 (1883).
60 Id at 558; see also Wildenthal, Lost Compromise, supra note 9, at Parts I.C-D and II.B-
IV (discussing Field's views, or lack thereof, on incorporation prior to Hurtado).
61 The only reference to that clause in Hurtado came when the majority quoted the passage
in Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1876), holding both that civil jury trial was not an inherent
element of due process and that it was not a privilege or immunity of United States citizenship.
Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 533 (quoting Walker, 92 U.S. at 92-93).
62 U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury .... ").
63 See Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 519-20; Brief for Plaintiffin Error [i.e., Hurtado, the defendant
at trial] at 5-6, Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884) [hereinafter Hurtado Defendant's
Brief]. The Supreme Court briefs in Hurtado are reprinted in 8 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND
ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATEs: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 395-475
(Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds. 1975).
64 See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). Hurtado suggested the broader
implications of incorporation in contending that
the Federal Constitution does not by express language secure a person against an arrest by State
authority without a warrant, nor.., the right to be informed of the nature of the offense, to a
speedy trial, the right to appear by counsel, or to trial byjury, and yet no one would dare to deny
that these things are secured by the Fourteenth Amendment because they constituted a part of due
process of law at the time of its adoption.
Hurtado Defendant's Brief, supra note 63, at 34.
65 176 U.S. 581,605-17 (1900) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also infra Part IV.
66 See PRZYBYSZEWSKI, supra note 40, at 163-67; Przybyszewsld Diss., supra note 40, at
199-250.
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practice in construing the scope of "due process of law."67 Matthews refused to be
bound by ancient practices thought to give that phrase determinate content as a legal
term of art. In a fascinating foretaste of twentieth-century debates between Justices
Hugo Black and Felix Fmnkfirter, Matthews rejected the idea that due process had
"by immemorial usage... acquired a fixed, definite, and technical meaning .... -68
Rather, it was concerned with "[a]rbitrary power.., whether manifested as the
decree of a personal monarch or of an impersonal multitude. '69
It follows that any legal proceeding enforced by public authority, whether
sanctioned by age and custom, or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative
power, in furtherance of the general public good, which regards and preserves these
principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of law.70
Harlan took issue with this approach in words whose spirit would be strikingly
echoed many years later by Black:
It is said by the court that the Constitution... was made for an undefined and
expanding future, and that... due process.., must be so interpreted as not to deny to
the law the capacity of progress and improvement.... It is difficult, however, to
perceive anything in the system of prosecuting human beings for their lives, by
information, which suggests that the State which adopts it has entered upon an era of
progress and improvement in the law of criminal procedure.71
Many modem lawyers familiar with how the criminal justice system actually
operates would side with the Hurtado majority and against Justice Harlan on the
67 Compare Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 521-32 (opinion of the Court), with id. at 539-47,549-56
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
68 Id. at 521.
69 Id at 536.
70 l at 537. Cf Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46,67 (1947) (Frankfbrter, J., concurring):
A construction which gives to due process no independent function but turns it into a
summary of the specific provisions of the Bill of Rights would... deprive the States of
opportunity for reforms in legal process designed for extending the area of freedom. It would
assume that no other abuses would reveal themselves in the course of time than those which had
become manifest in 1791.
71 Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 553. Cf Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 170 (1968) (Black, J.,
concurring):
I am not bothered by the argument that applying the Bill of Rights to the States... prevent[s]
States from trying novel social and economic experiments. I have never believed that under the
guise of federalism the States should be able to experiment with the protections afforded our
citizens through the Bill of Rights.
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utility of the grand jury. Instead of that time-honored but practically ineffective
check on prosecutors, criminal defendants themselves might well prefer "the
proceeding by information, after examination and commitment by a magistrate,
certifying to the probable guilt of the defendant, with the right on his part to the aid
of counsel, and to the cross-examination of... witnesses." 72 As California's
attorney in Hurtado asked, "What accused would exchange an open examination
before a committing magistrate for a secret inquisition into his offenses?" 73
Harlan, however, was not just clinging to the grand jury out of old-fashioned
attachment to traditional procedures. As Professor Przybyszewski has explained,
the jury, in both its grand and petit forms, held for Harlan a uniquely important role
as a democratic lay institution in his civic republican vision-a barrier of the
common people between the individual and officers of the state, whether judges or
prosecutors.74 That a criminal defendant might actually prefer to take his chances
with a magistrate rather than a group of his fellow citizens would not have carried
much weight with Harlan.75
The most notorious analytical gambit of the Hurtado majority was its argument
from superfluity: that because the Fifth Amendment expressly guarantees both due
process and grand jury indictment, the latter is outside the scope of either the Fifth
or Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clauses.76 This redundancy argument,
echoing the Court's 1878 suggestion in Davidson v. New Orleans that the right of
just compensation was not part of due process, 77 flew in the face of the Court's
earlier opinion in Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co.78 That
1856 case held that in deciding whether a given procedure "is due
processL] ... [w]e must examine the constitution itself, to see whether this process
72 Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 538.
73 Brief for Defendant in Error [California] at 20, Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516
(1884).
74 See PRZYBYSZVSKI, supra note 40, at 164-65; Przybyszewski Diss., supra note 40, at
202-04,210-14,247-50.
75 Cf Przybyszewski Diss., supra note 40, at 203 (noting that Harlan's "idealized vision of
the workings of ajury led him to underestimate how whites could turn the criminal justice system
into a means of racial oppression"). "When Harlan dissented in Hurtado, he proclaimed his
devotion to the people's participation in their government. The individual defendant's stake in the
outcome of a jury trial is an obvious one. The people's interest[,] while less immediately
apparent[,] was equally important to him." Id. at 249-50.
76 Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 534-35.
77 See Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 105 (1878); see also Hurtado, 110 U.S. at
533-35 (quoting and discussing Davidson and Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22 (1880));
Wildenthal, Lost Compromise, supra note 9, at Part IV (discussing Davidson and Lewis).
78 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856).
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be in conflict with any of its provisions. '79 The Murray's Lessee Court, quite
untroubled by the notion of constitutional superfluity, noted, for example, that the
Sixth Amendment right to a criminal jury trial is largely redundant to the original
Constitution's guarantee that "[t]he Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of
Impeachment, shall be by Jury .... -80
Murray's Lessee implied that at least all procedural guarantees in the Bill of
Rights are properly incorporated in the concept of due process, entirely apart from
the Privileges and Immunities Clause.81 One can, of course, take the view that "due
process" embraces at least all procedural guarantees important enough to be
specified in the Constitution, and yet also agree with Justice Frankfurter that it is
"[not] confined to them. The Due Process Clause... has an independent
potency .... -"82 Justice Black's view that the Due Process Clause has no procedural
content apart from other specific provisions of the Bill of Rights was a troubling
and unnecessary outgrowth of his total incorporation theory.83 The second Justice
John Marshall Harlan, an ally of Frankfirter in opposing incorporation, quite
emphatically believed that "due process is a discrete concept which subsists as an
independent guaranty of liberty and procedural fairness, more general and inclusive
than the specific prohibitions [of the Bill of Rights]. ' '84
It is, of course, one of the great ironies of American constitutional history that
the elder Justice Harlan's views on incorporation found vindication with Justice
Black but not with his own grandson, Black's longtime friend and colleague on the
7 9 Id. at 277.
80 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3; Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 276. The Hurtado
majority acknowledged Murray's Lessee, but misconstrued it to mean merely
that a process of law, which is not otherwise forbidden, must be taken to be due process of law,
if it can show the sanction of settled usage both in England and in this country; but it by no means
follows that nothing else can be due process of law.
Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 528. Au contraire, it is clear from the cited passage in Murray's Lessee that
"a process of law" which is "otherwise forbidden" by the Constitution (as prosecution for capital
or infamous crimes absent grand jury indictment is) cannot be "due process of law."
81 See CuRTs, No STATE, supra note 12, at 166, 174; Amar, supra note 12, at 1225-26;
Crosskey, supra note 30, at 6-7.
82 Adamson, 332 U.S. at 66 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
83 Cf In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 377-86 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting); ELY, supra note
13, at 20-21. Justices Frank Murphy and Wiley B. Rutledge had the right idea in Adamson:
"Occasions may arise where a proceeding falls so far short of conforming to fundamental
standards ofprocedure as to warrant constitutional condemnation in terms of a lack of due process
despite the absence of a specific provision in the Bill of Rights." 332 U.S. at 124 (Murphy, J.,
joined by Rutledge, J., dissenting); see also Wildenthal, Lost Compromise, supra note 9, at 1059
n.25.
84 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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Court.8 5 Yet, while differing on the incorporation issue, grandfather and grandson
were very much in tune in rejecting Black's limitation on the procedural scope of
due process. Responding to the Hurtado majority's redundancy argument, the elder
Harlan objected that
too much stress is put upon the fact that the framers of the Constitution made express
provision for the security of [certain] rights ... and, in addition, declared, generally, that
no person shall "he deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." The
rights, for... which... express provisions were made, were of a character so
essential... that it was deemed wise to avoid the possibility that Congress ... would
impair or destroy them. Hence, their specific enumeration in the earlier amendments of
the Constitution, in connection with the general requirement of due process of law, the
latter itself being broad enough to cover every right of life, liberty or property secured
by the settled usages and modes of proceedings existing under the common and statute
law of England at the time our government was founded.86
The Court-in an opinion written, appropriately enough, by the elder Justice
Harlan-politely ignored the Hurtado redundancy argument in the 1897 case that
inaugurated the practice of selective incorporation via the Due Process Clause.87
Harlan's response to the argument in Hurtado, relying in part on Muray's Lessee, 88
dramatically presaged his debate with future majorities over incorporation of the
rest of the Bill of Rights. The majority's logic, he said,
would require it to be likewise held that the right not to be put twice in jeopardy of life
and limb, for the same offense, nor compelled in a criminal case to testify against one's
self... were not protected by.. .due process of law.... More than that, other
amendments of the Constitution... expressly recognize the right of persons to just
compensation for private property taken for public use; their right, when accused of
85 See YARBROUGH, supra note 39, at 226 (noting Black's friendship with younger Harlan
and that Black displayed elder Harlan's portrait in his chambers). Justice Black was even
"convinced that the Blacks and Harlans were distant relations" Id. Black was born in 1886 in a
tiny Alabama hamlet called Harlan, and was delivered by a cousin of his named Dr. John J.
Harlan. See GERALD T. DUNNE, HUGO BLACK AND THE JUDICIAL REVOLUTION 85-89 (1977);
ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY 3 (1994).
86 Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 550 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
8 7 See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy RR Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226,241 (1897); infra
Part 11.B; see also CURTIS, No STATE, supra note 12, at 189 ("no 'canon' of constitutional
construction is more regularly and correctly ignored than the doctrine of
nonsuperfluousness ... announced in Hurtado").
88 See Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S.
(18 How.) at 276-77); see also Hurtado Defendant's Brief, supra note 63, at 28 (same).
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crime, to ... trial, by an impartial jury... [and] to be confronted with the witnesses
against them ... Are they to be excluded... ?89
Yes, the Court would later hold, as to all but one of the rights just mentioned.
Harlan would live to see most of his parade of horribles come true.9 0
In a technical sense, Hurtado sheds no light on what any of the Justices thought
about incorporation under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, since that issue
was not raised or addressed. 91 But it is troubling that Justices Joseph P. Bradley and
William B. Woods, who both supported incorporation in the early 1870s,92 joined
the majority opinion. They denied relief to a defendant in a capital case who
invoked the Fourteenth Amendment and whose claim would have been undeniable
under the incorporationist consensus prevailing just ten years earlier.
Professor Morrison argued that in light of Hurtado, Justice Harlan's later
support for incorporation via the Privileges and Immunities Clause was a mere
"afterthought." 93
This [Hurtado] opinion of... Harlan is ofparticular interest because 16 years later
he became the great exponent... of... incorporat[ion] .... But in 1884 it apparently
did not occur to him to place this interpretation upon the Amendment This is all the
more noteworthy because... Harlan had intense feelings upon the issue
in... Hurtado .... If at that time he had supposed that the Fourteenth Amendment
could legitimately be construed to incorporate the Bill of Rights as such, it is incredible
that he should not have said so. The express terms of the Fifth Amendment [Grand Jury
89 Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 547-48 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
90 The exception was the right of just compensation. See supra note 87; infra Part HII3
(discussing Chicago B&Q); see also infra Part IV and note 303 (discussing Maxwell v. Dow, 176
U.S. 581 (1900) (disincorporating right to jury trial), West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258 (1904)
(disincorporating right of confrontation), and Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908)
(disincorporating privilege against self-incrimination)). Harlan did not live to see the Court's
fulfillment of his warning that it would disincorporate the rule against double jeopardy, see
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), nor did he have what would have been the sweeter
satisfaction of witnessing its eventual decisions to overrule Maxwell, West, Twining, and Palko
in, respectively, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400
(1965), Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), and Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
91 See Newsom, supra note 13, at 723-26 (discussing Hurtado).
92 See Wildenthal, Lost Compromise, supra note 9, at Part IIA (discussing Woods's support
for incorporation as federal circuit judge, see, e.g., United States v. Hall, 26 F. Cas. 79, 81-82
(C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871), and Bradley's support for incorporation in private correspondence with
Woods); id at Part IlD (discussing Bradley's incorporationist dissent in Slaughter-House 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) at 118-19 (Bradley, J., joined by Swayne, J., dissenting)); id at Part I.C (discussing
Bradley's incorporationist circuit court opinion in United States v. Cruikshank, 25 F. Cas. 707,
714-15 (C.C.D. La. 1874), affidon other grounds, 92 U.S. 542 (1876)).
93 Morrison, supra note 26, at 152.
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Clause] would have settled the matter and would have made unnecessary the exhaustive
researches into the historical meaning of due process ... by... the majority, as well as
by... Harlan himself.94
In fact, it was only eight years later, not sixteen, that Harlan explicitly embraced
total incorporation via the Privileges and Immunities Clause.95 More to the point,
there is nothing "incredible" about his failure to do so in Iurtado, if one takes
seriously the idea that judges should only pass upon the issues brought before
them.96
Justice Harlan did in fact rely, quite emphatically, on the "express terms" of the
Fifth Amendment Grand Jury Clause to support his view of the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause.97 Furthermore, while it is true that reliance on
incorporation via the Privileges and Immunities Clause would have made it
unnecessary to consider whether grand jury indictment was a procedure inherent in
due process, the reverse is equally true. Harlan had no need to address the Privileges
and Immunities Clause because he would have granted all the reliefrequested under
the Due Process Clause. Professor Morrison seemed to think due process was the
more difficult issue, but it clearly was not for Harlan. For Harlan to address the
Privileges and Immunities Clause would not only have been needless judicial
activism on his part,98 it would have required equally if not more "exhaustive
researches" into the true meaning and tangled construction of that clause in cases
like Slaughter-House, Walker, and Cruikshank99
Hurtado provides a useful juncture to consider one of the modern arguments
against total incorporation: that it is simply inconceivable that those who framed
and adopted the Fourteenth Amendment meant to fasten on the states the supposed
94 Id at 146-47.
95 See O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323,370 (1892) (Harlan, J., dissenting); infra Part lIA.
96 It is hombook law-and goes to the very essence ofjudicial power and restraint in the
American tradition, including our courts' traditional aversion to advisory opinions-that a court
generally will not, and should not, address an issue abandoned or never raised before it, see
Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 526 U.S. 156, 164 n.4 (1998) (noting that 'it would be improper
for us sua sponte to raise and address" a question not raised by parties before Court); see also, e.g.,
Posters 'N' Things, Ltd. v. United States, 511 U.S. 513, 527 (1994); Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia, SA. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408,415 n.10 (1984); Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749,
754 n.7 (1962); Newsorn, supra note 13, at 726-27 nA10, with rare exceptions such as the court's
own lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, see, e.g., Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211
U.S. 149, 152 (1908). As the Court stated in Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414,444 (1944),
"No procedural principle is more familiar... than that a constitutional right may be forfeited in
criminal as well as civil cases by the failure to make timely assertion of the right.. "
97 See Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 546 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
98 Morrison himselfnoted that the issue was not raised. See Morrison, supra note 26, at 147.
99 See generally Wildenthal, Lost Compromise, supra note 9.
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"strait jacket" 100 of the Bill of Rights, most notably the grand and civil jury
requirements. By the mid-twentieth century, many if not most states, exploiting the
leeway allowed by Walker and Hurtado, had abandoned or modified the practices
of grand jury indictment and civil jury trial in ways forbidden to the federal
government under the Fifth and Seventh Amendments. Justice Frankfurter
scornfully argued in 1947 that "[e]ven the boldest innovator would shrink from
suggesting to more than half the States that they may no longer initiate prosecutions
without indictment by grand jury, or that thereafter all the States of the Union must
furnish ajury of twelve for every case involving a claim above twenty dollars." 101
But the historical evidence collected by Justice Frankfurter himself in a later
case102 helps to demonstrate that applying the entire Bill of Rights to the states-
even including the grand and civil jury requirements--would not have been viewed
as a radical or unduly disruptive "innovation" in 1868, when the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified. Of the thirty-seven states in the Union at that time, all but
one guaranteed civil jury trial as a matter of state constitutional right, in a manner
at least substantially in accord with the Seventh Amendment.10 3
There was, it is Irue, more divergence with regard to the grand jury. Still,
twenty-three states in 1868-nearly two-thirds-guaranteed grand jury indictment
in full accordance with the Fifth Amendment.10 4 To be sure, the grand jury lost
10 0 Cf Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 89 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) ("I cannot
consider the Bill of Rights to be an outworn 18th Century 'straitjacket' as the Twining opinion
did.').
101 Id. at 64-65 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also, eg., Faimnan, supra note 27, at 82-84,
137-3 8; Charles Fairman, A Reply to Professor Crosskey, 22 U. CHi. L. REV. 144, 155 (1954)
[hereinafter Fairman, Reply].
102 See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 140-49 (1959) (appendix to opinion of the Court
by Frankfurter, J.).
103 See Wildenthal, Lost Compromise, supra note 9, at 1146 & nn.438-439.
104 See ALA. CONST. of 1867, art. I, § 10, reprinted in I SouRcEs AND DOCUMENTs OF
UNITED STATES CONSTrrUILmoNs 82 (William F. Swindler ed. 1973-79) [hereinafter ST. CONST.];
ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 9, reprinted in I ST. CONST., supra, at 382; CAL. CONST. of 1849,
art. I, § 8, reprinted in 1 ST. CONST., supra, at 447-48; DEL. CONST. of 1831, art. I, § 8, reprinted
in 2 ST. CONST., supra, at 217; FLA. CoNsT. of 1868, art. I, § 9, reprinted in 2 ST. CONST., supra,
at 353; ILL. CoNsr. of 1848, art. XIII, § 10, reprinted in 3 ST. CoNsT., supra, at 267; IOWA CONST.
of 1857, art. I, § 11, reprinted in 3 ST. CONS., supra, at 452; KY. CONST. of 1850, art. XI, § 13,
reprinted in 4 ST. CONST., supra, at 183; ME. CONST. of 1819, art. I, § 7, reprinted in 4 ST.
CONST., supra, at 315; MisS. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 31, reprinted in 5 ST. CONSr., supra, at 378;
MO. CONST. of 1865, art. I, § 24, reprinted in 5 ST. CONsT., supra, at 517; NEB. CONST. of 1867,
art. I, § 8, reprinted in 6 ST. CONST., supra, at 151; NEv. CONST. of 1864, art. I, § 8, reprinted in
6 ST. CoNST., supra, at 264; N.J. CoNsT. of 1844, art. I, § 9, reprinted in 6 ST. CONST., supra, at
454; N.Y. CONsT. of 1846, art. I, § 6, reprinted in 7 ST. CONST., supra, at 192; N.C. CONST. of
1868, art. I, § 12, reprinted in 7 ST. CONST., supra, at 415; OHIO CoNsT. of 1851, art. I, § 10,
reprinted in 7 ST. CONST., supra, at 559; PA. CONsT. of 1838, art. IX, § 10, reprinted in 8 ST.
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ground thereafter. Many states were modernizing their criminal justice systems
around this time, and dispensing with the grand jury was a common step. California
itself, for example, from which Hurtado arose, had fully guaranteed grand jury
indictment in 1868, but shifted to prosecution by information in 1879, after the
judicial evisceration of the Privileges and Immunities Clause had largely been
accomplished.' 05
This would all seem to say more about attitudes toward the grand jury in
particular than about incorporation in general. Of the twenty-four specific privileges
and immunities articulated in the Bill of Rights,106 all or almost all states complied
CONST., supra, at 303; I. CONST. of 1842, art. I, § 7, reprinted in 8 ST. CoNsT., supra, at 387;
S.C. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 19, reprinted in 8 ST. CONST., supra, at 495; TENN. CoNsr. of 1834,
art. I, § 14, reprinted in 9 ST. CONST., supra, at 153; W. VA. CONsT. of 1863, art. II, § 1, reprinted
in 10 ST. CONST., supra, at 342; Wis. CONST. of 1848, art. I, § 8, reprinted in 10 ST. CoNST.,
supra, at 419. A twenty-fourth state guaranteed grand jury indictment in all criminal cases where
the potential punishment was death or life imprisonment. See CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. I, § 9,
reprinted in 2 ST. CONST., supra, at 145. There was no correlation between whether a state
guaranteed grand jury in 1868 and whether it ratified the Fourteenth Amendment by 1868. Of the
foregoing twenty-four states that guaranteed some type of grand jury indictment, twenty ratified
by 1868 (Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Missouri, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, Tennessee, West Virginia, and Wisconsin), and four did not (California, Delaware,
Kentucky, and Mississippi). Of the thirteen states not guaranteeing any type of grand jury
indictment, ten ratified by 1868 (Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, New Hampshire, Oregon, and Vermont), and three did not (Maryland, Texas, and
Virginia). See Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 140-45 (listing states in July 1868 proclamation ofratification
of Amendment).
105 Compare CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. I, § 8 (guaranteeing grand jury), reprinted in 1
ST. CONST., supra note 104, at 447-48, with CAL CONsT. of 1879, art. I, § 8 (replacing grand jury
,with information), reprinted in 1 ST. CONST., supra note 104, at 470. Cf. Fairman, supra note 27,
at 98-100 (noting that Illinois Constitution of 1870 allowed legislative abolition of grand jury).
106 These may be numbered as follows: (1) rule against establishment of religion, (2) free
exercise of religion, (3) freedom of speech, (4) freedom of the press, (5) right of peaceable
assembly, (6) right of petition, see U.S. CONST. amend. I, (7) right to keep and bear arms, see id.
amend. II, (8) freedom from quartering of soldiers, see id. amend. II, (9) search, seizure, and
warrant guarantees, see id. amend. IV, (10) right to grand jury indictment, (11) immunity from
double jeopardy, (12) privilege against self-incrimination, (13) right to just compensation for
private property taken for public use, see id. amend. V, (14) right to speedy trial, (15) right to
public trial, (16) right to impartial jury trial within state and district where crime was allegedly
committed, (17) right to be informed of nature and cause of accusation, (18) right to be confronted
by adverse witnesses, (19) right of compulsory process to obtain favorable witnesses, (20) right
to counsel, see id. amend. VI, (21) right to common law civil jury trial, see id. amend. VII, (22)
immunity from excessive bail, (23) immunity from excessive fines, and (24) immunity from cruel
and unusual punishments, see id. amend. VIII. The right to due process of law, see id. amend. V,
is of course not at issue because the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates that specifically, see id.
amend. XIV, § 1. See also Wildenthal, Lost Compromise, supra note 9, at 1077 n.90.
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in 1868-at least in principle and on paper-with all twenty-three other than grand
jury indictment.107 Given the political imperatives for Republicans supporting
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is doubtful whether anyone considered
or cared much about the relatively minor particulars in which some states were not
already in conformity with the Bill of Rights.108 That could have been worked out
by litigation or legislation.
There is an air of unreality about Professor Fairman's argument that, if the
Fourteenth Amendment had been understood to incorporate the entire Bill of
Rights, opponents would have used that as political ammunition. 109 He even went
so far as to describe the prospect of enforcing the Bill of Rights against the states
107 Justice Frankfurter and Professor Fairman argued that several states in 1868 deviated in
certain other ways (apart from the grand jury issue) from exact conformity with the Bill of Rights,
but the evidence consisted mostly of minor (in some cases debatable) inconsistencies with certain
aspects of Sixth or Seventh Amendment jury trial rights. Cf Bartlas, 359 U.S. at 140-45
(Frankfurter, J.) (Georgia, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Michigan deviating in certain
respects from precise federal practice of crininal trial byjury of twelve); Fainnman, supra note 27,
at 82 (Connecticut not expressly guarding against double jeopardy, nor New Hampshire against
invasion of freedom of speech, though Fairman did not suggest that either state approved of
violating such principles and conceded that "[o]ne can easily imagine that [they] would have seen
no objection to abiding by the federal Bill of Rights in those respects"); id. at 86-87 (New
Hampshire not abiding by rule against establishment of religion); iad at 88 (New Jersey arguably
not fully in conformity with Seventh Amendment, by allowing trial byjury of six men in civil
cases); id at 102 (Nevada arguably not fully in conformity with Seventh Amendment by allowing
three-fourths majority verdicts in civil cases); id. at 122-23 (Nebraska arguably not fully in
conformity with Seventh Amendment, by allowing "trial by ajury of a less number than twelve
men, in inferior courts"); id. at 127-28 (Georgia arguably not fully in conformity with Sixth and
Seventh Amendment jury trial rights).
108 See CURTIS, No STATE, supra note 12, at 185; Amar, supra note 12, at 1246-54;
Crosskey, supra note 30, at 111-12; see also Michael Zuckert, Book Review, 8 CONST. COMM.
149, 160-61 (1991) (reviewing RAOUL BERGER, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL
OF RIGHTS (1989), CURTIS, No STATE, supra note 12, and ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI, THE
POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE FEDERAL COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND
CIVL RIGHTS, 1866-1876 (1985)) (noting minor nature ofinconsistencies with Bill of Rights and
that "all this happened long before the Warren Court began to interpret the Bill of Rights in ways
that did indeed challenge many of the prerogatives to which the states had become accustomed").
The political imperatives supporting readmission of "reconstructed," pro-Republican southern
states, in order to boost Republican strength in Congress, tend to undermine the significance of
the few deviations from the Bill of Rights scholars have pointed to in the constitutions adopted by
several such states (often in conjunction with their coerced ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment) and approved by Congress upon readmission. Compare, e.g., Fairman, supra note
27, at 126-32, and JAMES E. BOND, No EASY WALK TO FREEDOM: RECONSTRUCTION AND THE
RATIFICATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 45, 111, 180-82, 220-21, 235-38, 252-62
(1997), with CURTIS, No STATE, supra note 12, at 131-56, Amar, supra note 12, at 1246-54, 1256
n.271, and Crosskey, supra note 30, at 85-88, 100-11.
109 See Fairman, supra note 27, at 137-38; Fairman, Reply, supra note 101, at 155.
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as a "menace." I 1 0 But as Professor Amar observed with refreshing common sense,
"Who wants to campaign against the Bill of Rights?" 11' In fact, enforcing the entire
Bill of Rights against the states was regarded by even the most conservative
Democrats who spoke to the issue in the early 1870s as a minimalist position which
they eagerly embraced. 112 That the idea became a radical menace to some in the
twentieth century is interesting, indeed strange, but has no bearing on the
understanding in the nineteenth century.
Perhaps most peculiar is that Professor Fairman twice triumphantly
emphasized, as if it supported his ultimate argument, that even Michigan, the home
state of that arch-incorporationist, Republican Senator Jacob M. Howard, did not
afford any right to grand jury indictment. 113 Indeed, Howard had been Attorney
General of Michigan years earlier when the state legislature abolished the grand
jury and provided for prosecution by information. 114 But what does that tell us?
Certainly not that Howard opposed incorporation. He was more Catholic than the
Pope on that issue.1 15 He may have overlooked the detail of the grand jury, but
whether he was aware of that conflict or not, he did not seem to care much about
it, whereas it is obvious he cared very deeply about enforcing the Bill of Rights
against the states as a general matter.
The example of Senator Howard, far from undermining the incorporationist
understanding, tends to destroy any remaining significance that the grand jury or
other variances between contemporary state practices and the Bill of Rights might
be thought to have. It proves that it was likely that proponents of the Amendment
were willing to accept possible changes in a few aspects of some states' civil or
110 Fairman, Reply, supra note 101, at 155. Dean Bond, in a recent echo of this Fairman
argument, asserted: "Had the amendment's opponents suspected that the due process clause was
a Trojan horse for the Bill of Rights, they would have attacked it venomously. After all, they
speculated endlessly about the evil ends that the framers had allegedly concealed in other
provisions ofthe amendment." BOND, supra note 108, at 252. Well, yes, but only ifone presumes
the dubious premise that enforcing the Bill of Rights against the states would have been
understood by the public at large (or even the opponents of the Fourteenth Amendment
themselves) as an "evil end."
111 Amar, supra note 12, at 1253.
112 See Wildenthal, Lost Compromise, supra note 9, at Part Ill.A. 1.
113 See Fairman, supra note 27, at 115-16, 134.
114 See id. at 115-16.
115 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2764-66 (May 23, 1866) (Howard's famous
speech introducing Fourteenth Amendment in Senate); Wildenthal, Lost Compromise, supra note
9, at 1073-74. Fairman's only explanation for this supposed paradox was an ad hominem footnote
essentially implying that Howard was a fuzzy-minded buffoon not to be taken seriously. See
Fairman,supra note 27, at 134 n381. Butsee Wildenthal, Lost Compromise, supra note 9, at 1072
n.73, 1074 n.81.
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criminal procedures, even in their own states-if they even thought about such
issues-as the price of the greater imperatives at stake.
The fact that the states have now relied for more than a century on Walker and
Hurtado to restructure their civil and criminal justice systems is a persuasive
argument for granting those cases the respect of stare decisis. But it furnishes no
ground to question the broader theory of incorporation via the Privileges and
Immunities Clause. Bowing out of necessity to Walker and Hurtado does not
undermine the legitimacy of the near-complete incorporation of the rest of the Bill
of Rights that has properly, by now, been achieved.
C. Slaughter-House Revisited and Presser
Just two months after the Court decided Hurtado, it revisited Slaughter-House
in Butchers' Union Slaughter-House andLive-StockLanding Co. v. Crescent City
Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter-House Co. (Slaughter-House I). 116 Louisiana,
in 1879, had chosen to abolish the monopoly privileges that gave rise to the 1873
Slaughter-House decision. The Crescent City company, which had enjoyed that
monopoly, brought suit claiming a violation of the Contract Clause. 117 Justice
Miller, again writing for the Court, upheld the 1879 repeal on the ground that the
state could not contract away its inherent police power to regulate "public health
and public morals." I 18 He had no occasion to say anything bearing on incorporation
or the implications in that regard of his own 1873 opinion.
In Slaughter-House I, however, as in the earlier decision, Justice Miller spoke
only for a bare majority of five. Justices Field and Bradley were still on the Court
and their feelings had not mellowed with time. They reiterated in separate
concurring opinions their 1873 dissenting views that the monopoly was an
outrageous violation of natural and common law rights embodied in the Fourteenth
Amendment. 119
116 111 U.S. 746 (1884).
117 See id. at 746--49; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. I ("No State shall ... pass any... law
impairing the obligation of contracts .... ).
118 Slaughter-House 1, 111 U.S. at 751. See generally id. at 749-54.
119 See id at 754-60 (Field, J., concurring); id at 760-66 (Bradley, J., joined by Harlan and
Woods, JJ., concurring). Bradley found the repeal valid because the original monopoly was
"against common right," id at 76 1, and, more specifically, violated the Privileges and Immunities,
Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, id. at 763-64. Field
relied somewhat more generally on Section 1 of the Amendment, see id. at 758-59, and, like
Bradley, emphasized the natural-law and common-law grounds, see id. at 754-58, of his
conclusion that the monopoly was "against common right, and void," id at 760. The influence of
laissez-faire capitalist economic philosophy on Field's views was again, as in his 1873 Slaughter-
House dissent, quite evident. See id at 757 (quoting ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE
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Justices Harlan and Woods replaced Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase and Justice
Noah H. Swayne, by then gone from the Court, in siding with Justices Bradley and
Field in Slaughter-House 17120 Woods had been on public record supporting
incorporation since 1871, as a federal circuit judge, 121 and Harlan, fresh from his
dissent in Hurtado, would soon become the champion par excellence of that
theory.122 That they chose to join the Slaughter-House H concurrence of Bradley,
who explicitly endorsed incorporation in Slaughter-House itself, 123 can only add
to one's eagerness in scanning the Bradley and Field opinions in Slaughter-House
H for any clues on incorporation. Alas, there are few if any.
Justices Bradley and Field both reiterated their criticisms of Justice Miller's
1873 Slaughter-House majority opinion, but neither found it necessary to address
the Bill of Rights, since again it furnished no particular aid in condemning the
disputed monopoly. 124 Field thus remained, yet again, a sphinx on incorporation.
Bradley did state that "I then held [in Slaughter-House], and still hold, that the
[Privileges and Immunities Clause] has a broader meaning [than the 1873 majority
gave it]; that it includes those fundamental privileges and immunities which belong
essentially to the citizens of every free government .... "125 But while one might
wish that this embraced by silent implication Bradley's explicit (and Miller's
strongly implied) 1873 endorsement of incorporation, it must be balanced against
Bradley's devastating silence in Walker, Cruikshank and Hurtado,126 and his
authorship of Missouri v. Lewis. 127
Unfortunately, whatever hope Slaughter-House IT might have furnished that
Justice Woods (at least) might adhere to the incorporation theory, was undermined
just two years later. Woods wrote the unanimous opinion of the Court in Presser
AND CAUsES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONs (1776)); see also Wildenthal, Lost Compromise, supra
note 9, at 1091 n.152.
120 See Slaughter-House II, 111 U.S. at 760-66 (Harlan and Woods, JJ., concurring with
Bradley, J.).
121 See supra note 92.
122 See infra Parts mH-IV.
123 See supra note 92.
124 See Slaughter-House A, 111 U.S. at 760 (Field, J., concurring); id. at 764 (Bradley, J.,
concurring). It is intriguing that Bradley criticized Miller's 1873 opinion for holding "that the
'privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States'... are only those privileges and
immunities which were created by the Constitution ofthe United States, and grew out of it, or out
of laws passed in pursuance of it," id at 764 (emphases added), and that Field included "the right
to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances" in his recap of Miller's 1873 list of
protected privileges and immunities, id. at 760. But nothing came of these hints.
125 Id. at 764 (Bradley, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
126 See supra Parts I and II.B; Wildenthal, Lost Compromise, supra note 9, at Parts II.B-C.
127 101 U.S. 22 (1880); see also Wildenthal, Lost Compromise, supra note 9, at Part IV.
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v. Illinois, 128 which upheld the criminal conviction of a man for unlawfully
participating in an armed paramilitary parade. In so doing, the Court rejected
Hermann Presser's argument that the Illinois law in question violated his right to
keep and bear arms under the Second and Fourteenth Amendments. 129 The Court
found it "clear that... forbid[ding] bodies of men to associate together as military
organizations, or to drill or parade with arms in cities and towns unless authorized
by law, do[es] not infringe the right of the people to keep and bear arms. ' 130 The
Court continued, citing Cruikshank: "But a conclusive answer... [is] that the
[Second] [A]mendment is a limitation only upon the power of Congress and the
National government, and not upon that of the States."'131
It may be argued that the Second Amendment is uniquely unsuited to
incorporation-and perhaps does not protect any freestanding individual right-
because of its linkage of the right to bear arms with governmental maintenance of
a "well regulated militia."1 32 The Presser Court, for example, suggested that a state
would violate the Second Amendment only if it "prohibit[ed] the people from
keeping and bearing arms, so as to deprive the United States of their rightful
resource for maintaining the public security, and disable the people from
128 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
129 Presser's brief was poorly organized and written. He argued that the Illinois law under
which he was convicted violated the Second Amendment itself, see Brief for Plaintiffin Error [i.e.,
Presser, the defendant at trial] at 9-10, 31-36, Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886) [hereinafter
Presser Defendant's Brief], and as a separate assignment of error, that it violated Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, without specifying how and without expressly invoking any particular
theory of incorporation, see id. at 10-11. His summary of his assignments of error cited the
Second and Fourteenth Amendment claims together, however, see id. at 5, and the Fourteenth
Amendment assignment followed immediately after that of the Second Amendment see id. at 9-
11. The state thus understood Presser to argue that the Second Amendment right to bear arms was
incorporated via the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth. See Brief for Defendant
in Error [Illinois] at 7-9, Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886) [hereinafter Presser State's
Brief]; see also Presser Defendant's Brief, supra, at 44 (incorporating by reference and attaching
Brief for Defendant in Error Peter J. Dunn[e] (filed by Lyman Trumbull), Dunne v. People, 94 Ill.
120 (1880) [hereinafter Dunne Brief]); id., at 10-11 (arguing that Privileges and Immunities
Clause "secure[s] ... the right to keep and bear arms as part of the militia which Congress has the
right to organize" and that "[t]his is a national right which the national government has the power
and which is its duty to enforce"). Cf Morrison, supra note 26, at 147 (erroneously stating that in
Presser, "[t]he question does not seem to have been raised whether the Second Amendment had
been made applicable to the states through ... the Fourteenth Amendment"); STEPHEN P.
HALBROOK, FREEDMEN, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, ANDTHERIGHTTOBEARARMS, 1866-
1876, at 184, 196 & n.9 (1998) (same, citing Morrison, supra note 26, at 147).
130 Presser, 116 U.S. at 264-65.
131 Id. at 265.
132 U.S. CONST. amend. II.
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performing their duty to the general government"1 33 The Court proceeded to reject
Presser's Privileges and Immunities Clause claim, in part because he "was not a
member of the organized volunteer militia of the State of fllinois, nor did he belong
to the troops of the United States or to any organization under the militia law of the
United States. ' 134 Modem scholarship has cast doubt on whether Second
Amendment rights may properly be limited in this fashion, although that important
and interesting issue is beyond the scope of this article.135
Responding to Presser's somewhat ambiguous Fourteenth Amendment claim,
the Court inferred that he also meant to argue a violation under the First
Amendment, as incorporated into the Fourteenth, of "his right to associate with
others as a military company."136 Again citing Cruikshank the Court reaffirned its
holding in that case that the right of peaceable assembly was not protected against
state power, "except... to perform the duties or exercise the privileges of citizens
of the United States." 137
We should not, perhaps, make too much of Presser, especially as to Justices,
like Harlan, who merely joined silently in the opinion. The Court's decision seems
ultimately to have turned not on the issue of incorporation but on a narrow reading
of the rights sought to be incorporated. The incorporation theory is not necessarily
inconsistent with the Court's conclusion, on the facts presented, that Presser's
claimed "right... to associate together as a military company or organization, or
to drill or parade with arms, without... an act of Congress or law of the State
authorizing the same, is not an attribute of national citizenship."' 38 The Court found
the state power in question "necessary to the public peace, safety and good order.
To deny the power would be to deny the right of the State to disperse assemblages
organized for sedition and treason, and the right to suppress armed mobs bent on
riot and rapine."'139
133 Presser, 116 U.S. at 265.
134 Id. at 266.
135 See Wildenthal, Lost Compromise, supra note 9, at 1152 & n.471 (citing AMAR, BILL
OF RIGHTS, supra note 12, at 46-63, 257-66, HALBROOK, supra note 129, and Koren Wai Wong-
Ervin, Note, The Second Amendment and the Incorporation Conundrum: Towards a Workable
Jurisprudence, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 177 (1998)).
136 presser, 116 U.S. at267;see also supra note 129;Presser State's Brief, supra note 129,
at 6 ("We submit that the right of the people to assemble even for a lawful purpose is not such a
right as it is the duty of the general government to enforce. By the first amendment of the
constitution Congress is merely prohibited from abridging that right.); Dunne Brief, supra note
129, at 11 (referring to both right to bear arms and right of peaceable assembly).
137 Presser, 116 U.S. at 267.
138 Id
139 Ia at 268. It is difficult, of course, to see why suppressing peaceable assemblies was
"necessary" to these goals. The Court's repressive tone suggests a certain Gilded Age panic over
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It is certainly difficult, however, to square Justice Woods's authorship of
Presser-especially in view of his silent concurrence in Hurtado-with any
continued loyalty on his part to the incorporation theory. He appears to have
acquiesced to cases like Cruikshank Walker, Davidson, and Lewis, decided before
he joined the Court in 1881.140 Of course, Justice Harlan also acquiesced on the
facts of Presser, only to reassert his incorporationist views later. Would Justice
Woods have done likewise in a case squarely raising the issue? We will never
know. He died the year after Presser, after only six years on the Court.141
D. John Randolph Tucker and the Spies Appeal
Six months after Justice Woods's death, the Court considered an appeal in the
politically sensational case of Spies v. Illinois. 14 2 Spies, like Presser, arose from
Chicago and, more generally, from the radical ferment then percolating around the
country. August Spies and his seven codefendants were anarchists charged with
conspiracy to commit murder in the Haymarket incident of May 4, 1886, in which
a bomb, thrown by an unidentified person during an anarchist rally near Haymarket
Square in Chicago, killed several police officers.143 Although Spies and two of his
codefendants had spoken at the rally,144 and the defendants had generally engaged
in revolutionary activism and writing, no plausible evidence ever connected them
to the bombing or showed any conspiracy by them to kill or harm anyone. 145 They
were nevertheless convicted and all but one were sentenced to death.14 6 Following
unsuccessful appeals to the Illinois and U.S. Supreme Courts, the suicide on death
row of one of the defendants, and the commutation of two of the remaining death
the rising tide of worker and anarchist protests during this period. See L.H. LaRue, Constitutional
Law and Constitutional History, 36 BUFF. L. REV. 373, 375-81, 386-91, 400-01 (1987)
(discussing historical and social background of Presser, and of Spies v. Illinois, 123 U.S. 131
(1887), discussed infra Part II.D). See generally PAuL AvRIcH, TE HAYMARKET TRAGEDY 55-
119 (1984) (discussing the rise of the anarchist movement).
140 See OXFORD SUPREME COURT, supra note 37, at 968.
141 See id.
142 123 U.S. 131 (1887).
143 See AVRICH, supra note 139, at 181-239. Of the eight police officers who eventually
died, and the sixty who were wounded, many were apparently shot by their fellow officers, who
opened fire in a panic. Seven or eight civilians were also killed, and several dozen wounded, by
police gunfire. See id at 207-10. The bomb was thrown after police ordered dispersal of the rally,
which had been peaceful up to that point and was in the process of winding down anyway. See
id. at 205-06,210-14.
144 See id. at 199-206.
145 See id. at 267-78.
14 6 Id at 279.
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sentences by Illinois Governor Richard J. Oglesby, Spies and three of his
codefendants were hanged on November 11, 1887.147
In 1893, Illinois Governor John Peter Altgeld pardoned the three surviving
Haymarket defendants on grounds that the trial, as historians have come to agree,
was "a shameless travesty ofjustice." 148 Among other problems, the trial judge and
jury were hopelessly biased against the defendants, jury selection was rigged, the
prosecutor was allowed to indulge in outrageous misconduct and to introduce
inflammatory and irrelevant evidence focusing on the defendants' unpopular
political views, and the trial judge authorized the jury to convict on the basis of a
startlingly far-reaching and legally unfounded theory of conspiracy and accomplice
liability.149 The defendants' petition to the U.S. Supreme Court in 1887 raised
numerous claims, most notably that they had been denied, in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment the right to trial by an impartial jury,150 the privilege
against self-incrimination,' 51 the right to security from illegal searches and
seizures,152 the rights of free speech and peaceable assembly,153 and the right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against them.154
The Spies petition was presented first to Justice Harlan, who referred it to the
full Court, 155 which agreed to hear oral argument on "whether any Federal
questions were actually made and decided in the Supreme Court of
[Illinois] ... [and] upon the character of those questions, so that we may determine
whether ... to bring the case here for review."1 56 In support of the petition, counsel
for the defendants made the first systematic argument before the Court for total
147 See id at 334-98.
148 Id at 422. See generally id. at 415-27. Altgeld was assailed as an "anarchist," a
"socialist," and an "apologist for murder" because of his principled action; his political career was
destroyed as a result. JOHN F. KENNEDY, PROFILEs IN COURAGE 233-34 (1956).
149 See AVRICH, supra note 139, at 260-78.
150 See Spies, 123 U.S. at 133-36; Petition of August Spies and Others for Writ of Error
(filed by Moses Salomon, William P. Black, Roger A. Pryor, and John Randolph Tucker) at 2-14,
Spies v. Illinois, 123 U.S. 131 (1887) [hereinafter Spies Petition]. Although Black's and Tucker's
full names do not appear on the petition, their full names are disclosed in AVRICI-, supra note 139,
at 250,334.
151 See Spies, 123 U.S. at 136-38; Spies Petition, supra note 150, at 15-17.
152 See Spies, 123 U.S. at 138; Spies Petition, supra note 150, at 17-20.
153 See Spies, 123 U.S. at 139; Spies Petition, supra note 150, at 20-24.
154 See Spies, 123 U.S. at 140; Spies Petition, supra note 150, at 35-44.
155 See Spies, 123 U.S. at 142 (statement of Harlan, J.).
156 Id. at 143 (statement of Waite, C.J.).
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incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth Amendment invoking both the
Due Process and Privileges and Immunities Clauses. 157
The attorneys who presented this argument are as interesting as the argument
itself. The lead trial attorney for the defendants was William P. Black, one of the
most successful and prominent corporate lawyers in Chicago. Black was a Civil
War hero who won the Medal of Honor at age nineteen, having volunteered for the
Union Army despite being "[b]orn in Kentucky, the son of a Presbyterian minister
who supported the Confederacy."' 158 For the U.S. Supreme Court appeal, Black
retained three other renowned lawyers whose lives were also profoundly affected
by the Civil War, though in fascinatingly diverse ways.
The lead attorney on the appeal was John Randolph Tucker, who had just
completed twelve years in Congress as a Democratic Representative from
Virginia. 159 Tucker was retained at the instigation of the first attorney Black hired
for the appeal, Roger A. Pryor, "a prominent Wall Street lawyer, who had been a
brigadier general in the Confederate army. ' 160 Tucker was a states'-rights politician
before and after the Civil War. He served as Attorney General of Virginia under the
Confederacy and taught law at what is now Washington and Lee University from
1870 until his election to Congress in 1874, and then from 1887 until his death in
1897. He became dean of the law school in 1893 and was president of the American
Bar Association in 1892-93.161
157 See id. at 143-55 (argument for petitioners of John Randolph Tucker); id. at 155-56
(argument for petitioners of Roger A. Pryor); id at 157-59 (argument for petitioners ofBenjanin
F. Butler); Brief for Petitioners (filed by Moses Salomon, William P. Black, Roger A. Pryor, and
John Randolph Tucker) at 2, Spies v. Illinois, 123 U.S. 131 (1887) [hereinafter Spies Petitioners'
Opening Brief]; Supplemental Brief for Petitioners (filed by Roger A. Pryor) at 1-18 (Due Process
Clause), 18-23 (Privileges and Immunities Clause), Spies v. Illinois, 123 U.S. 131 (1887)
[hereinafter Spies Petitioners' Supplemental Brief]. Pryor's "argument' reprinted in the case report
is apparently just a summary of his written brief. See Spies, 123 U.S. at 155-56; Spies Petitioners'
Supplemental Brief, supra. Pryor did present oral argument to the Court in support of the petition
on October 21, 1887, but no summary of that is provided in the case report. The main arguments
took place on October 27 and 28, 1887, followed by the Court's decision on November 2, 1887.
See Spies, 123 U.S. at 131, 143.
158 AVRICH, supra note 139, at 251. See generally id at 250-52.
15 9 See CONGRESSIONALQUARTERLY'S GUDETO U.S. ELECnIONS 1030, 1035,1039,1043,
1047, 1051, 1055 (3d ed. 1994) [hereinafter U.S. ELECrIoNs] (elected to House in 1874, 1876,
1878, 1880, 1882, and 1884; did not run in 1886). In 1888 his son, Henry St. George Tucker, was
elected to succeed him. The younger Tucker served in Congress from 1889 to 1897, and again
from 1922 until his death in 1932. See id. at 1059, 1063, 1069, 1074; 19 DICrIoNARY OF
AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 33 (1936) [hereinafter DICr. AM. BIO.].
160 AVRICH, supra note 139, at 334.
161 See AVRICH, supra note 139, at 334; CURTIS, No STATE, supra note 12, at 185-86; 19
DICr. AM. Bro., supra note 159, at 34-35; 21 AMERIcAN NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 898 (1999)
[hereinafter AM. NAT'L BIO.]. His grandfather was St. George Tucker (1752-1827), an esteemed
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Tucker was regarded as one of the most distinguished constitutional lawyers
of his day, 162 and has been described as "an old-fashioned, strict-constructionist,
state-rights logician," who opposed Reconstruction and was a stickler for "applying
the yard stick of constitutionality to every measure before Congress."'1 63 He became
known as "one of the ablest and most articulate representatives from the South,"' 164
serving as Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee in 1879-81 and Chairman
of the Judiciary Committee in 1883-87.165 "When friends expressed surprise at his
defense of the Chicago anarchists, Tucker replied, 'I do not defend anarchy. I
defend the Constitution."' 166
Rounding out the team on appeal, and an intriguing counterpart to the two
former Confederates, was Black's fellow Union Army veteran, General Benjamin
F. Butler. Butler was a flamboyant and iconoclastic progressive on economic issues
and civil rights, favoring not only racial equality but also female suffrage and the
eight-hour day. 167 He commanded African-American soldiers in the Civil War,
administered New Orleans during Reconstruction, and by 1887 had served
Massachusetts as both a Republican Congressman and a Democratic Govemor, and
had run for president in 1884 on the Greenback Party ticket.168 In Congress he was
Virginia judge and legal scholar who published a famous 1796 pamphlet advocating the gradual
abolition of slavery, a major annotated edition of Blackstone's Commentaries for American
lawyers, and "the first extended, systematic commentary on the [United States] Constitution"
folloving its ratification. See Clyde N. Wilson, Forewordto ST. GEORGE TUCKER, VIEW OF THE
CONSTMTrON OF'THE UNnTED STATES WrH SELECrED WRrNGS vii (Clyde N. Wilson ed., 1999)
(1803); 19 Dicr. AM. BIO.,supra note 159, at 34,38-39.
162 See AVRICH, supra note 139, at 334.
163 19 Dicr. AM. BIO., supra note 159, at 35 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
CURTIS, No STATE, supra note 12, at 186; 21 AM. NAT'L BIO., supra note 161, at 898.
164 21 AM. NAT'LBIO., supra note 161, at 898.
165 See BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN CONGRESS: 1774-1996, at 1966
(1997).
166 CURTIS, No STATE, supra note 12, at 186; see also 19 DIcr. AM. BIO., supra note 159,
at 35.
167 See ERIC FONER, RECONSiRucION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877,
at 233,315,455,491-92,498-99,521-22,524,533-34,553-55 (1988).
168 See AVRICH, supra note 139, at 334; see also FONER, supra note 167, at 45-48,491-92,
524; U.S. ELECTIONS, supra note 159, at 1014, 1017, 1021, 1025, 1029, 1033 (elected to House
as Republican in 1866, 1868, 1870, 1872, and 1876, though defeated in Democratic landslide of
1874). Butler served as Governor of Massachusetts for one year in 1883-84 (Massachusetts
governors were elected to one-year terms until 1920), having been elected in 1882 on a combined
Democratic, Greenback, and Labor Party ticket. Butler had previously run for governor in 1859
as a Democrat and in 1878 and 1879 on the "Butler Democratic and Republican" ticket. He was
defeated for reelection in 1883. See U.S. ELECTIONS, supra note 159, at 649, 686, 1352-54.
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an ardent advocate of a broad reading of the Fourteenth Amendment, acting as
House manager of the Civil Rights Act of 1875.169
Tucker argued before the Court that the rights protected by the Privileges and
Immunities Clause were "such as have their recognition in or guaranty from the
Constitution of the United States."170 He reasoned that, "while the [first] ten
Amendments, as limitations on power, only apply to the Federal government, and
not to the States, yet in so far as they declare or recognize rights ofpersos,... the
Fourteenth Amendment as to such rights limits state power, as the ten Amendments
had limited Federal power."1 71 Tucker's co-counsel Butler and Pryor concurred in
separate arguments.172
169 See FONER, supra note 167, at 533-34; see also id. at 455,491-92,498-99,524,553-
55.
170 Spies, 123 U.S. at 150. The cited portion of the Spies case report, see id. at 143-55,
reprints a presumably condensed version of Tucker's oral argument before the Court. The brief
signed by Tucker did not elaborate on incorporation, only mentioning once, in general terms, the
argument that "the privileges and immunities of petitioners as citizens of the United States, were
abridged, contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment" Spies Petitioners' Opening Brief, supra note
157, at 2. The supplemental brief filed by Tucker's co-counsel Pryor elaborated somewhat further
on the incorporationist interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause:
What are the 'privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States,' in the sense of th[e]
[Fourteenth] [A]mendment, has not yet been settled by exhaustive analysis or definite formula;
but, by reference to the original amendments to the Constitution, we may discover, with infallible
certainty, what are some of those rights and immunities; for when the Constitution of the nation
enumerates certain rights and liberties as inherent and inviolable in its citizens-inviolable even
by its own action-we may know that those rights and liberties constitute privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States.
Spies Petitioners' Supplemental Brief, supra note 157, at 18-19. See generally id. at 18-23.
Tucker addressed the problem posed by the fact that Spies and one of the other Haymarket
petitioners were not American citizens (Spies was German) by reasoning that whatever rights the
Privileges and Immunities Clause secured to citizens of the United States were necessarily secured
to aliens residing in the United States, since the Fourteenth Amendment also guaranteed that "no
person shall be denied the equal protection ofthe laws." Spies, 123 U.S. at 153 (emphasis added
by Tucker); see also id. at 159-61 (Butler arguing that Spies and the other non-U.S. citizen
petitioner were protected by treaties with Germany and Great Britain); infra note 296.
171 Spies, 123 U.S. at 151.
172 See id. at 156 (Pryor's argument); id. at 157-59 (Butler's argument); Spies Petitioners'
Supplemental Brief, supra note 157, at 18-23. Butler did not sign the petitioners' Supreme Court
petition or either of their briefs. A fifth attorney for the petitioners, Moses Salomon, did sign the
petition and the opening brief, but, like co-counsel Black, did not present oral argument to the
Court. See Spies Petition, supra note 150; Spies Petitioners' Opening Brief, supra note 157; Spies
Petitioners' Supplemental Brief, supra note 157.
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Scholars have read Tucker's argument in Spies in different ways.173 Professor
Morrison, for example, read Tucker as advocating, not incorporation of the entire
Bill of Rights, but only those parts of it securing rights deemed "fundamental." 174
Tucker did state that the guarantees of the Bill of Rights constitute privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States "in so far as they secure and recognize
fundamental rights--common law rights-of the man."175 But it appears that
Tucker considered all the rights specified in the Bill of Rights to be, by definition,
"fundamental." This is indicated by his statement, immediately following the
language just quoted, that the Fourteenth Amendment encompasses all Bill of
Rights provisions that "declare or recognize rights of persons."'176 This is also
supported by his co-counsel Pryor's brief, which argued that, while the full scope
of protected privileges and immunities "has not yet been settled by exhaustive
analysis or definite formula," 177 one could, "by reference to the original
amendments to the Constitution, ... discover, with infallible certainty,"'178 what at
least some of them were. "[F]or when the Constitution... enumerates certain rights
and liberties as inherent and inviolable in its citizens... we may know that those
rights and liberties constitute privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States."179
173 Notable discussions appear in CURTIS, No STATE, supra note 12, at 185-88, Amar, supra
note 12, at 1270-71, Morrison, supra note 26, at 147-48, 172 n.63, and Newsom, supra note 13,
at 709-12.
174 See Morrison, supra note 26, at 172 n.63.
175 Spies, 123 U.S. at 151.
176 Id. This limiting "filter" applied by Tucker, cf Amar, supra note 12, at 1270, would
simply seem to have recognized the fact that parts of the first ten amendments do not guarantee
any specific personal rights, but rather, for example, state a cautionary rule of construction
regarding rights not specified, see U.S. CONST. amend. IX, or reserve to the states and to the
people powers not delegated to the federal government, see U.S. CONST. amend. X.
177 Spies Petitioners' Supplemental Brief, supra note 157, at 18.
178 Id. at 19.
179 Id; see also supra note 170. Tucker conceded that Walker, Hurtado, and Presser could
be viewed as "contrary to this view," Spies, 123 U.S. at 152, but he at least purported to
distinguish them-noting, for example, that Presser may be read to have rested primarily on a
narrow reading of the federal rights sought to be incorporated, see Spies, 123 U.S. at 152; supra
Part II.C. His attempt to distinguish Walker and Hurtado was less than convincing. See Spies, 123
U.S. at 152 (noting that Hurtado was "decided on a clause of the Fiflth Amendment' and Walker
on "the Seventh Amendment," while ignoring the fact that both cases turned primarily on the
Court's interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and Walker, specifically, on the Privileges
and Immunities Clause); see also id. at 151-52 (citing Cruikshank but not acknowledging that
case's anti-incorporationist implications-indeed, suggesting that it supported his incorporationist
argument). Cf Wildenthal, Lost Compromise, supra note 9, at Part MIB (discussing Walker), Part
IHI.C (discussing Cruikshank). As Professor Curtis pointed out in a conversation with me, Tucker,
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Professor Amar, by interesting contrast, cited Tucker as supporting his
"refined" theory of incorporation, associating Tucker with Justice Bradley's
approach to incorporation in Slaughter-House, and disassociating him from Justice
Black's approach in Adamson 180 Tucker's approach to incorporation may well
have been more "refined" than Black's, which had its problems, as discussed in Part
I.B, regarding the scope of procedural due process. But in diametric opposition to
Morrison, Amar may have implied too broad a scope for Tucker's incorporation
argument. Tucker's argument seems aligned with Black's and deeply at variance
with Bradley's, in that Bradley had refused quite emphatically in Slaughter-House
to be limited by the textual scope of the Bill of Rights in defining protected
Fourteenth Amendment privileges and immunities. 181 Tucker, like Black, limited
such privileges and immunities to those that "have their recognition in or guaranty
from the Constitution."182 Tucker thus seems to have been, like Black and Justice
Miller (at least in Slaughter-House), a textual incorporationist.
Indeed, what no scholar other than Newsom seems to have discussed is that
Tucker relied heavily on the incorporationist reading of the Slaughter-House
majority opinion.183 Tucker cited Slaughter-House at four different points to
with these citations, may simply have been fulfilling his ethical obligation to alert the Court to
contrary precedent arguably on point. See infra note 183.
180 See Amar, supra note 12, at 1270-71.
181 See Wildenthal, Lost Compromise, supra note 9, at Part II.D.
182 Spies, 123 U.S. at 150; see also HUGO LAFAYErEBLACK, A CONSHTLuYONAL FArH
18-21, 34-42 (1968); Wildenthal, Lost Compromise, supra note 9, at Part II.C (discussing Black's
textualist rationale for total incorporation). Pryor's brief; as discussed above, admittedly casts some
doubt on this reading of Tucker, since Pryor seemed to suggest that constitutional text was an
"infallibl[y] certai[n]" floor, but perhaps not a ceiling, for the scope of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause. Tucker, however, did not sign Pryor's brief, and Pryor's implication of a
possible supratextual scope for the clause was a far cry from Bradley's emphatic embrace of
natural and nontextual rights. Pryor, after all, emphasized the importance of text, while Bradley
(like Field in Slaughter-House) expressly disdained it. See Wildenthal, Lost Compromise, supra
note 9, at Parts II.C-D (discussing Field's and Bradley's Slaughter-House dissents).
183 See Newsom, supra note 13, at 709-12 (discussing Tucker's argument in Spies).
Newsom did not, however, discuss the anti-incorporationist views expressed in Tucker's 1899
treatise, discussed infra text accompanying notes 192-97. Professor Curtis stated that "[a]fter the
decisions in the Slaughter-House Cases, Hurtado, and the rest, Tucker faced an uphill battle in
Spies," CURTIS, No STATE, supra note 12, at 186, thus treating Slaughter-House, in accordance
with the conventional view, as a barrier that Tucker had to overcome. Tucker did not so treat it.
Curtis suggested in a conversation with me that this reflects Tucker's skill, brilliant lawyer that he
was, in making lemonade from lemons (after all, he was ethically obliged to acknowledge
Slaughter-House as precedent, see supra note 179). My parry would be that Slaughter-House was
lemonade to begin with, and was only turned to vinegar by later cases.
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support his argument.184 He noted that "[i]f the views of the minority... in the
Slaughter-House Cases... be adopted, [my] argument... would only be the
stronger, but I shall rest upon that of the mjoity .... "185 His argument that
Fourteenth Amendment privileges and immunities are those that "have their
recognition in or guaranty from the Constitution ' 186 closely paraphrased Justice
Miller's reference in Slaughter-House to privileges and immunities that "owe their
existence to the... Constitution." 18 7
Chief Justice Morrison R. Waite's unanimous opinion for the Court in Spies
recited the settled rule that the Bill of Rights applies of its own force only to the
federal government, citing many of the cases discussed in this article and its
predecessor, including Twitchell, Edwards, Walker, Cruikshank Davidson, and
Presser.188 But the Court did not actually respond to Tucker's argument that the
Fourteenth Amendment extended the Bill of Rights to the states. Rather, it held,
following detailed but unconvincing analysis, that no violation of the asserted Bill
of Rights guarantees themselves (even assuming them to be applicable) had been
shown.1 89 It thus dismissed the petition for lack ofjurisdiction.' 90 This cleared the
way for a legal lynching of the Haymarket petitioners, and is undoubtedly one of
the more shameful abdications in the Court's history of its ultimate responsibility
to uphold the rule of law.
It is less surprising than it might seem at first blush that a states'-rights
Democrat and former Confederate like Tucker would join forces on incorporation
184 See Spies, 123 U.S. at 149, 150,151, 152. As Newsom pointed out, Tucker specifically
cited the pages in Slaughter-House corresponding to Justice Miller's discussion of assembly,
petition, and habeas corpus, see id. at 152 (citing Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 79);
Newsom, supra note 12, at 710, and to Justice Bradley's more extensive discussion of the Bill of
Ri ghts, see Spies, 123 U.S. at 152 (citing Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 118 (Bradley, J.,
dissenting)); Newsom, supra note 12, at 710-11. "Thus ... Tucker seemed to recognize... that,
while they did not agree about everything, the majority and dissenting Justices in Slaughter-House
did agree that the Privileges or Immunities Clause incorporated core Bill of Rights freedoms."
Newsom, supra note 12, at 711 (emphasis added).
185 Spies, 123 U.S. at 150.
186 Id.
187 Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 79; see also Newsom, supra note 12, at 709.
188 Spies, 123 U.S. at 166; see also Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833); supra
Part HI.C (discussing Presser); Wildenthal, Lost Compromise, supra note 9, at Part HA (discussing
Twitchelo, Part II1.B (discussing Edwards and Walker), Part mH.C (discussing Cruikshank), and
Part IV (discussing Davidson).
189 See Spies, 123 U.S. at 167-82.
19 0 Id. at 182. For a contemporary argument taking a far narrower view of the Fourteenth
Amendment than Tucker did, and castigating the Court for bothering as much as it did with the
Haymarket case, see William H. Dunbar, The Anarchists' Case Before the Supreme Court of the
United States, 1 HARV. L. REV. 307 (1888).
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with a pro-civil-fights Unionist like Butler. Both Southern Democrats and
Reconstructionist Republicans, by the early 1870s, seem to have accepted as
common ground the incorporationist reading of both Slaughter-House and the
Fourteenth Amendment. 191
But did Tucker's argument in Spies merely reflect the needs of his clients rather
than his own views? That would seem unlikely based on his own comment quoted
above, that he took the case not to defend the anarchists but to "defend the
Constitution." And why, indeed, would such a prominent and respected statesman
and scholar choose to take such a high-profile and controversial case if he did not
feel a genuine philosophical commitment to the argument?
Contrary evidence, however, is provided by Tucker's magisterial two-volume
treatise on the Constitution, posthumously edited and published in 1899 by his son,
Henry St. George Tucker, who also succeeded him in Congress and on the law
faculty of Washington and Lee University. 192 Tucker's treatise discussed the
Fourteenth Amendment Privileges and Immunities Clause in two passages. The
first, despite the teasing promise of Tucker's own rhetorical question-"[W]hat are
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States as to the abridgment of
which no State shall make or enforce any law?" 193 -never focused on the
incorporation issue. He did quote Justice Miller's Slaughter-House formulation that
they were 'those which owe their existence to the Federal government, its national
character, its constitution or its laws,"I' 194 and cited a couple, such as the privileges
to vote and practice law, that the Court had found not protected.195 The second
passage merely cited Walker-and Spies itself-for the proposition that
any denial of a right in a State court which by any one of the ten amendments [of the
Bill of Rights] is forbidden, is not unconstitutional, for those amendments are limits
upon Federal power only, and the State court may do, contrary to the terms of those
amendments, what the Federal court is forbidden to do.196
Perhaps Tucker, with a decade's hindsight, read Spies, in conjunction with the
Court's anti-incorporation decisions before and since, as foreclosing the issue.
191 See Wildenthal, Lost Compromise, supra note 9, at Parts II.A and HII.AA.
192 See Henry St. George Tucker, Preface to 1 JOHN RANDOLPH TUCKER, THE
CONsTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: A CRmCAL DISCUSSION OF ITS GENEsIs, DEVELOPMENT,
AND INTERPRETATION v-viii (Henry St. George Tucker ed., 1899); supra note 159.
193 1 TUCKER, supra note 192, § 174, at 344.
194 Id. at 345 (quoting Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 79).
195 See id. (citing Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1875), and Bradwell v.
Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873)).
196 2 id.§ 389, at 854; see also id. at 852-54.
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Tucker does not seem to have been one to bow to precedent for its own sake,197 so
his own views may have shifted by the time of his death. In the final analysis, that
does not matter much. As with Justice Miller's 1873 opinion in Slaughter-House,
of ultimate importance is not what personal conclusion Tucker arrived at in the end,
but the fact that his 1887 argument reflected a reasoned and relatively contemporary
understanding that Slaughter-House may indeed be read in an incorporationist
light' 98
While Tucker's argument might seem surprising and counterintuitive under the
orthodox view of Slaughter-House and the early incorporation debate that has
generally prevailed up to now, it is utterly unsurprising given the understanding of
Slaughter-House urged in this author's previous article and reflected in the
congressional debates of the early 1870s. After all, Tucker was first elected to
Congress in 1874, just after the incorporationist consensus on the Fourteenth
Amendment and Slaughter-House seems to have reached its zenith, as advocated
by Tucker's allies among states'-rights Southern Democrats. 199 Butler was first
elected to Congress in 1866, and served throughout that critical period in the early
1870s.200 Their "odd bedfellows" collaboration in Spies was not so odd after all. It
was an intriguing and highly symbolic revival of the lost compromise of Slaughter-
House.
ll. THE 1890s
What are the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States... ?... [Affler much reflection Ithink the definition given at one
time before this court by a distinguished advocate-Mr. John Randolph
Tucker, of Virginia-is correct, that [they] are such as have their
recognition in orguarantyfrom the Constitution of the United States.20 1
197 See l id. at vii-viii:
Th[is] book is an expression of the views of the author, not merely his intellectual opinions, but
his deep convictions, in the consistent exercise of which he lived and in the faith of which he died;
and neither the dissent of friendship, nor the storm of popular indignation, nor yet the hope of
political preferment, ever shook his unswerving devotion to them. He religiously believed that the
maintenance of these principles was necessary to the stability and preservation of the Union and
the happiness and prosperity of the people, and that their rejection would as certainly result in
tyranny, despotism and ultimate dissolution.
198 See Wildenthal, Lost Compromise, supra note 9, at Part IV (discussing the puzzle posed
by the views of Miller and other Justices during the 1870s).
19 9 See iL at Part IA.l; supra note 159.
200 See supra note 168.
201 O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 361 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting).
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A. The Crossroads of O'Neil
In O'Neil v. Vermont,202 the Supreme Court finally arrived at its most decisive
nineteenth-century confrontation with the issue of incorporation. The Eighth
Amendment immunity from cruel and unusual punishments was the bone of
contention on this occasion.2 03 Incorporation lost, five to three.204
O'Neil was a crossroads in several ways. Bradley, the first Justice to
unambiguously embrace total incorporation,20 5 died in office on January 22, 1892,
just two days after the case was orally argued and less than three months before it
was decided on April 4, 1892.206 The poignancy of that timing is somewhat
diminished by the fact, as we have seen, that Bradley had apparently already
abandoned his support for incorporation. And even if he had not, his vote would not
have made the difference anyway.
If, however, Justice Woods had also survived on the Court until O'Neil was
decided, when he would have been only sixty-seven207-and if he and Justice
Bradley had both remained loyal to the incorporation theory they corresponded
about and championed in the early 1870s208 -American constitutional history
might have been very different. As discussed below, Justice Field, in the evening
of his career at age seventy-five, 20 9 finally resolved the mystery of his views by
squarely embracing incorporation. Agreeing with Field on that point were Justice
Harlan and Field's nephew, Justice David J. Brewer, appointed two years earlier.210
During the seventy-four years between Slaughter-House and Adamson, O'Neil thus
represents the high-water mark for the incorporation theory on the Court.
John O'Neil, a New York wine and liquor merchant, was convicted before a
justice of the peace of 457 separate offenses of selling intoxicating liquors to
customers in Vermont, in violation of that state's prohibition law, although his
business was perfectly legal in New York Because he had a prior conviction under
the liquor law, he was subject to a fine of $20 on each count, or $9,612.96 including
court costs (a rather hefty total in those days), and one month's imprisonment at
202 144 U.S. 323 (1892).
203 See U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted:").
204 Compare O'Neil, 144 U.S. at 331-32, with id. at 359-65 (Field, J., dissenting), and id
at 370-71 (Harlan, J., joined by Brewer, J., dissenting).
20 5 See supra note 92.
206 0'Neil, 144 U.S. at 323; OXFORD SUPREME COURT, supra note 37, at 967.
20 7 See OXFORD SUPREME COURT, supra note 37, at 938. In fact, Woods died in office in
1887 at age sixty-two. See id. at 938,968.
208 See supra note 92.
209 See OXFORD SUPREME COURT, supra note 37, at 289.
2 10 Id. at 89.
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hard labor. In addition, if the fine were not fully paid by expiration of the one-
month prison term, he was subject to three days additional imprisonment for each
dollar of the fine-that is, 28,836 days, or about seventy-nine years. After appeal
to county court and jury trial, this was reduced to 307 distinct offenses, fine and
costs of $6,638.72, and imprisonment (failing payment) for 19,914 days, or more
than fifty-four years. 21 This was, in the words of Justice Field's flabbergasted
dissent, a "punishment... exceeding in severity, considering the offences of which
the defendant was convicted, anything which I have been able to find in the records
of our courts for the present century."212
In O'Neil, however, as in Walker and Cruikshank, the incorporation issue was
not raised before the U.S. Supreme Court.213 O'Neil did argue unsuccessfully
before the Vermont Supreme Court that his sentence violated "[t]he constitutional
inhibition of cruel and unusual punishments, or excessive fines or bail,"214 though
it was unclear whether the issue was invoked or resolved under the state or federal
constitutions or both.215 But no such claim was raised before the U.S. Supreme
Court. The primary issue was whether Vermont's prosecution of O'Neil amounted
to a regulation of interstate commerce violating the Commerce Clause.216 The
211 See O'Neil, 144 U.S. at 325-27,330-31; id. at 337-39 (Field, J., dissenting); see also
State v. Four Jugs of Intoxicating Liquor, 2 A. 586 (Vt. 1886), writ of error dismissed for want
ofjurisdiction sub nom. O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892).
212 O'Neil, 144 U.S. at 338 (Field, J., dissenting).
Had [O'Neil] been found guilty of burglary or highway robbery, he would have received less
punishment. ... It was six times as great as any court in Vermont could have imposed for
manslaughter, forgery or perjury. It was one which, in its severity, considering the offences of
which he was convicted, may justly be termed both unusual and cruel.
It. at 339.
2 13 See Wildenthal, Lost Compromise, supra note 9, at Parts IM.B-C (discussing Walker and
Cruikshank).
214 Four Jugs, 2 A. at 593; see also O'Neil, 144 U.S. at 331.
215 The Vermont Supreme Court did not clarify the issue, holding merely that O'Neil's
punishment
cannot be said to be excessive or oppressive. If he has subjected himself to a severe penalty, it is
simply because he has committed a great many of such offenses.... If the penalty were
unreasonably severe for a single offense, the constitutional question might be urged, but here the
unreasonableness is only in the number of offenses the respondent has committed.
Four Jugs, 2 A. at 593; see also O'Neil, 144 U.S. at 331-32.
216 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; O'Neil, 144 U.S. at 334-36; id. at 344-59 (Field, J.,
dissenting); id at 367-70 (Harlan, J.,joined by Brewer, J., dissenting); Brief for Plaintiffin Error
[i.e., O'Neil, the defendant at trial] at 6-20, O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892) [hereinafter
O'Neil Defendant's Brief]; Brief for Defendant in Error [Vermont] at 2-10 (filed by Walter C.
Dunton and P. Redfield Kendall), O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892); Brief for Defendant
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majority, in an opinion by Justice Samuel Blatchford, joined by Chief Justice
Melville W. Fuller and Justices Horace Gray, Lucius Q.C. Lamar, and Henry B.
Brown, stated, quite properly, that it would "forbear the consideration of th[e] [cruel
and unusual punishment] question, because... it is not assigned as error, nor even
suggested in [O'Neil's] brief .... ,"217
Unfortunately, the Court promptly yielded to the temptation it had just sworn
to "forbear." It stated that "as a Federal question, it has always been ruled that the
8th Amendment... does not apply to the States," citing a pre-1868 case in the
Barron line.2 18 While technically a correct statement of law as to the Eighth
Amendment standing alone, this rather unsatisfactorily ignored the existence of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The dissenters, for their part, effectively conceded that the
question had not been properly raised before the Court.219 But they proceeded to
in Error [Vermont] at 12-36 (filed by P. Redfield Kendall and George F. Edmunds), O'Neil v.
Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892). The majority and the dissenters disagreed on whether the
Commerce Clause issue had been properly raised or addressed in the courts below and therefore
on whether it was even properly before the Court. Compare id at 335-37 (opinion of the Court)
(holding that it was not, and therefore dismissing writ of error for want ofjurisdiction), with id. at
349-53 (Field, J., dissenting) (arguing that it was), and id at 367-69 (Harlan, J., joined by Brewer,
J., dissenting) (same). Justices Field, Harlan, and Brewer, who agreed with each other that the
Commerce Clause issue was properly before the Court, disagreed on how to resolve that issue on
the merits. Compare id. at 353-59 (Field, J., dissenting) (arguing that Vermont had violated
Commerce Clause), with id at 369-70 (Harlan, J., joined by Brewer, J., dissenting) (arguing it had
not). The depth of feeling the case aroused for Justice Field was reflected in a bizarre dispute he
engaged in with the court reporter concerning the accuracy of the Reporter's headnote with regard
to the majority's holding that the Commerce Clause issue was not properly preserved. See Alan
F. Westin, Stephen J. Field and the Headnote to O'Neil v. Vermont: A Snapshot of the Fuller
Court at Work, 67 YALE L.J. 363 (1958).
217 0'Neil, 144 U.S. at 331. See generally O'Neil Defendant's Brief, supra note 216. The
Court added that, "so far as it is a question arising under the constitution of Vermont, it is not
within our province." O'Neil, 144 U.S. at 331-32.
2180 'Neil, 144 U.S. at 332 (citing Pervear v. Massachusetts, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 475 (1867));
see also Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (holding that the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment is intended solely as a limitation on the federal government and is not applicable
to the states).
2 19 See O'Neil, 144 U.S. at 359-60 (Field, J., dissenting); id. at 370 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Justice Field argued that, jurisdiction over the case having been established, the Court could "look
into the whole record," and "if it appears from the proceedings taken and the rulings made in the
court below, on questions brought to its notice, that the rights of the accused, affecting his liberty
or his life, have been invaded, this court may exercise its jurisdiction for the correction of the
errors comrritted."Id at 359. Citing the Court's discretionary authority, under governing statutes
and rules, to address "plain errors" not expressly raised, Field said, "I do not think we should be
astute to avoid jurisdiction in a case affecting the liberty of the citizen." Id at 360; see also id. at
370 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[l]t is competent for this court to consider [the question], because we
have jurisdiction of the case upon the grounds already stated.").
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address it anyway, thus indulging in the type ofjudicial activism seen previously
on the other side in cases like Walker and Cruikshank220 Such activism by the
incorporationists was certainly more understandable, since-as the majority's just-
quoted dictum suggests-every passing year was fixing more firmly in precedential
concrete the erroneous and improperly activist repudiation of incorporation in those
very prior cases. The time had come to take a stand.
Justices Field and Harlan articulated the straightforward logic of textual
incorporation in their O'Neil dissents. That much has been addressed by earlier
scholarship.221 What has not been appreciated is how they drew upon the
incorporationist language and logic of Justice Miller's Slaughter-House opinion.
The connection is especially obvious when viewed in light of the other evidence set
forth in this article and in light of the incorporationist reading of Slaughter-House
set forth in this article's predecessor.222
Justice Field began his analysis by conceding the established doctrine that the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments, like all Bill of
Rights guarantees, did not itself apply to the states. "Such was undoubtedly the case
previous to the Fourteenth Amendment and such must be its limitation now, unless
[it] is one of the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States .... -1223
Field then confronted his old nemesis, Slaughter-House, and, in what must have
been a difficult reconciliation, he conceded, in effect that the scope of Justice
Miller's opinion was not so "vain and idle" as he had once contended.224 The
Slaughter-House majority, Field noted, had held that the Amendment protected
only
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States as distinguished from privileges
and immunities of citizens of the States. Assuming such to be the case, the question
arises: What are the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States which are
thus protected? These terms are not idle words to be treated as meaningless, and the
inhibition of their abridgment as ineffectual for any purpose, as some would seem to
think. They are of momentous import; and the inhibition is a great guaranty to the
citizens of the United States of those privileges and immunities against any possible state
invasion. It may be difficult to define the terms so as to cover all [such] privileges and
immunities ... but after much reflection I think the definition given at one time before
this court by a distinguished advocate-Mr. John Randolph Tucker, of Virginia-is
2 20 See Wildenthal, Lost Compromise, supra note 9, at Parts IH.B-C.
221 See, e.g., Morison, supra note 26, at 150-51.
222 See Wildenthal, Lost Compromise, supra note 9, at Part II.
223 O'Neil, 144 U.S. at 360 (Field, J., dissenting).
224 See Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 96 (Field, J., dissenting); Wildenthal, Lost
Compromise, supra note 9, at Part II.C.
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correct that the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States are such as
have their recognition in or guaranty from the Constitution of the United States. 2 2 5
Justice Field thus embraced, perhaps reluctantly, Tucker's vision of textual
incorporation, which in turn, as we have seen, was based on Justice Miller's
analysis and reflected the incorpomtionist compromise of Slaughter-House2 26 Field
continued by noting that, as modem scholars have confirmed and as he doubtless
knew firsthand, "[tlhis definition is supported by reference to the history of the first
ten Amendments to the Constitution, and of the Amendments which followed the
late Civil War."22 7 As Field summarized:
While... the [first] ten Amendments, as limitations on power,... are applicable only
to the Federal government and not to the States, yet so far as they declare or recognize
the rights of persons, they are rights belonging to them as citizens of the United States
under the Constitution; and the Fourteenth Amendment as to all such rights, places a
limit upon state power by ordaining that no State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge them. IfI am right in this view, then every citizen of the United States is
protected from punishments which are cruel and unusual. It is an immunity which
belongs to him, against both state and Federal action.2 28
Justices Harlan and Brewer declined to join Justice Field's dissent but only (it
appears) because they disagreed with his views on the Commerce Clause issue.2 2 9
In a separate dissent joined by Brewer, Harlan stated:
I fully concur with Mr. Justice Field, that since the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment no one of the fundamental rights of life, liberty or property, recognized
and guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States, can be denied or abridged by
a State .... These rights are, principally, enumerated in the earlier Amendments of the
Constitution.230
225 0'Neil, 144 U.S. at 361 (Field, J., dissenting) (citing Spies, 123 U.S. at 150).
226 See supra Part ll.D. See generally Wildenthal, Lost Compromise, supra note 9.
227 0'Neil, 144 U.S. at 361 (Field, J., dissenting).
228 Id. at 363 (Field, J., dissenting).
229 See supra note 216; Westin, supra note 216, at 375.
230 O'Neil, 144 U.S. at 370 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The rights are only "principally"
enumerated in the Bill of Rights because, of course, several are scattered throughout the original
Constitution. See infra Part V and note 387.
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Brewer, regrettably, turned out not to be a steadfast adherent of incorporation, as
perhaps foreshadowed by the slight ambiguity with which he joined Harlan's
O 'Neil dissent 231 And while the O 'Neil dissents provide additional support for the
incorporationist reading of Slaughter-House, they also underscore that any such
compromise consensus was fading badly almost twenty years later.
Professor Morrison was quite unimpressed by O'Neil:
Here then, in 1892, we get the first intimation from any Justice... that the
Fourteenth Amendment might be considered to incorporate the Bill of Rights. In view
of the long line of cases beginning in 1875 in which the question could have been
raised ... the conclusion is irresistible that it was not generally supposed that the
Amendment incorporated the Bill ofRights .... It is obvious that the views expressed
by... [the] dissenting opinions in O'Neil v. Vermont were in the nature of an
afterthought 232
We have already seen how thoroughly wrong that is. But there is no question that
as the 1890s dawned, the anti-incorporationists had the upper hand.
In several other cases decided in the early 1890s, the Court touched briefly on
the issue. For example, in Eilenbecker v. District Court ofPlymouth County,2 33 the
Court, in a unanimous opinion by Justice Miller,234 upheld punishment for
contempt of court without benefit ofjury trial or other incidents of ordinary criminal
prosecution. The Court recited in passing the rule that the first eight amendments,
231 See id. at 371 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ('Mr. Justice Brewer authorizes me to say that in
the main he concurs with the views expressed in this opinion."); infra Part III.B (discussing
Brewer's anti-incorporationist opinion in Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U.S. 172 (1899)). Brewer
later joined silently in the anti-incorporationist majority opinions in Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581
(1900), and Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908), discussed infra Part IV. On the other
hand, in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.A Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897), Brewer not
only agreed with the majority's incorporation of the Takings Clause, he dissented alone from the
Court's finding that no further compensation was due in that case. Id. at 258-63 (Brewer, J.,
dissenting); see also infra Part III.B. Brewer was generally known as a conservative defender of
laissez-faire economic liberties (like his uncle, Field), with a mixed record on civil rights. For
example, he wrote the Court's opinion in Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908), from
which Harlan dissented, see supra note 50, but he did not participate in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537,564 (1896), and dissented alongside Harlan in Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475,488-93
(1903) (Brewer, J., dissenting), see supra note 51. He also had a more progressive record than
Harlan or the Court as a whole in cases involving Asian immigrants. See supra note 58 (discussing
Harlan's dismal record in Chinese cases); OXFORD SUPREME COURT, supra note 37, at 89-90;
J. Gordon Hylton, The Judge Who Abstained in Plessy v. Ferguson: Justice David Brewer and the
Problem ofRace, 61 MISS. L.J. 315 (1991).
232 Morrison, supra note 26, at 151-52.
233 134 U.S. 31 (1890).
234 He would die in office later that year. OXFORD SUPREME COURT, supra note 37, at 967.
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of their own force, restrict only the federal government.235 But it relied on the
special character of criminal contempt proceedings, not on any broad repudiation
of incorporation, to find no violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 36
In Miller v. Texas, 237 the Court rejected a convicted murderer's challenge to a
Texas law restricting the carrying of weapons and authorizing the warrantless arrest
of persons violating the law. The Court's brief, unanimous opinion by Justice
Brown stated that it had "examined the record in vain... to find where the
defendant was denied the benefit' 38 of the Second or Fourth Amendment rights
to bear arms and be free of unreasonable searches or seizures. Again, it noted, these
did not apply of their own force to the states.2 39 Furthermore, the Court held, "ifthe
Fourteenth Amendment limited the power of the States as to such rights ... it was
fatal to this claim that it was not set up in the trial court. '240
The Court rejected appeals by New York death row inmates, alleging cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment in two other cases:
In re Kemmler 41 and McElvaine v. Brush.242 In each case, in unanimous opinions
by Chief Justice Fuller, the Court acknowledged the argument that the Eighth
Amendment applied to the states via the Fourteenth.2 43 In response, Kemmler cited
the narrow readings of the Privileges and Immunities Clause in Cruikshank and the
Due Process Clause in Hurtado.244 McElvaine simply cited Kemmler. 45 A review
of the briefs reveals that the prisoner's attorney in Kemmler tried to revive Tucker's
incorporation argument in Spies.24 6 The prisoner's attorney in McElvaine invoked
235 Eilenbecker, 134 U.S. at 33-35 (citing both pre- and post-1868 cases).
236 Id. at 35-39. It was not until much later that the Court applied the right ofjury trial to
some criminal contempt proceedings, at least those involving more than "petty" punishment, at
either the state or federal level. See, e.g., Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968); United States v.
Bamett, 376 U.S. 681, 694 n.12 (1964). Cf Newsom, supra note 13, at 721-23 (discussing
Eilenbecker).
237 153 U.S. 535 (1894).
238 Id at 538.
2 39 Id. (citing, e.g., Barron, Cruikshank and Spies).
24 0 Id. (emphasis added).
241 136 U.S. 436 (1890) (challenging electrocution as method of execution).
242 142 U.S. 155 (1891) (challenging solitary confinement prior to execution, under same
New York statute generally upheld in Kemmler).
24 3 Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 445-46; McElvaine, 142 U.S. at 158.
24 4 Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 448.
24 5 McElvaine, 142 U.S. at 158.
24 6 See supra Part II.D. Compare Brief for Plaintiff in Error [i.e., Kemmler, the defendant
at trial] at 7-9, In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890) [hereinafter Kemmler Defendant's Brief], with
Brief for Agent and Warden at 14-21, In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890) [hereinafter Kemmler
State's Brief].
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the Eighth Amendment but neglected to mention the Fourteenth or any theory of
incorporation.247
The dominant rationale of both Kemmler and McElvaine was simply that the
challenged methods of punishment were not (in the Court's view) cruel and
unusual, and that issue was also the dominant focus of the briefs.2 48 Professor
Morrison made much of Kemmler and McElvaine and the fact that Justices Field,
Harlan, and Brewer concurred silently in both decisions. This, he argued, caught
them in a peculiar "change of heartf when they later dissented in O'Neil.249 But the
opinions in Kemmler and McElvaine were handed down only three and fourteen
days after oral argument respectively,2 50 and it seems hardly surprising that the
O'Neil dissenters, who apparently agreed with the result and the dominant rationale,
did not bother to chum out separate opinions delving into incorporation. They did
so soon enough in O'Neil, when first confronted by a punishment they felt did
implicate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Morrison's treatment of
Kemmler and McElvaine provides still more evidence of his tendentiously skewed
approach to this entire line of case law.
B. The Curious Exception of Chicago B&Q
Five years after O'Neil, in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v.
Chicago (Chicago B&Q),251 the Court faced the question whether the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees the right to just compensation for takings of private
property. The railroad objected to the city's appropriation, for compensation fixed
247 See Brief for Appellant at 22-23, McElvaine v. Brush, 142 U.S. 155 (1891) [hereinafter
McElvaine Appellant's Brief]. This is easily the most bizarre brief I have ever read (and as a
former federal and state appellate court law clerk. I've seen quite a few clunkers). The attorney,
who seems to have been somewhat daft, expounded at remarkable length and in irrelevant and
gruesome detail on methods of execution in the Europe of antiquity, id at 11-20, and (typical of
editorial digressions throughout) commented at one point that "[t]he Constitution of the United
States, be it said with all reverence and Christian piety, is an inspiration of the Deity, as were the
Books of Moses and the Acts of the Apostles," id. at 22. The state, responding cautiously at one
point that "it is not entirely clear what was the exact point intended to be raised" by the underlying
habeas corpus petition, Brief for Agent and Warden at 14, McElvaine v. Brush, 142 U.S. 155
(1891) [hereinafter McElvaine State's Brief], relied mainly on Kemmler as authority for rejecting
any Fourteenth Amendment challenge, id. at 12-13, 19.
248 See Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 443-44,446-49; McElvaine, 142 U.S. at 158-60; Kemmler
Defendant's Brief, supra note 246, at 10-28; Kemmler State's Brief, supra note 246, at 21-24;
McElvaine Appellant's Brief, supra note 247, at 5-21, 23-34; McElvaine State's Brief, supra note
247, at 8-16.
24 9 See Morrison, supra note 26, at 148-50.
2 50 Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 436; McElvaine, 142 U.S. at 155.
251 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
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at one dollar, of a public right-of-way for a road crossing.252 As in Hurtado, the
Due Process Clause rather than the Privileges and Immunities Clause was invoked
as the vehicle ofprotection.2 53 The railroad may have done so in part because of the
long-established (though erroneous) rule that corporations are not "citizens"
protected by the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause. 54 In any event, in
striking contrast with all the other post-Slaughter-House cases we have seen, the
Court agreed unanimously with the railroad that the right of just compensation was,
in effect, incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment255 -though it also held, over
Justice Brewer's solitary dissent, that no further compensation was due in this
case.
25 6
What can account for this dramatic departure? Because the Fifth Amendment
guarantees both due process and just compensation,2 57 the logic (if any) of
Hurtado's argument from superfluity plainly dictated rejection of incorporation in
Chicago B&Q.258 Indeed, the Court had forecast exactly that conclusion, for exactly
that reason, in dicta nineteen years earlier. 59 The superfluity argument actually has
more force in the case of just compensation than with grand jury indictment, since
2 52 Id. at 230.
253 Id at 232-33; Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 34-50, Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R.
Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897) (No. 129) [hereinafter Chicago B&Q Railroad's Brief]. The
city did not dispute the railroad's argument that due process required just compensation (state law
already required just compensation), Chicago B&Q, 166 U.S. at 228-30; Brief for Defendant in
Error at 4-12, Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897) (No. 129)
[hereinafter Chicago B&Q City's Brief], but the city did dispute whether any further compensation
was required in this case, Chicago B&Q City's Brief, supra, at 30-43.
254 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1; Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180-82 (1869).
The Fourteenth Amendment clause was derived from the Article IV clause, and there would not
seem to be any reason to treat corporations as "citizens" under one but not the other. Modem
scholarship has demonstrated that this limitation is unwarranted and anachronistic, and should not
apply to either clause, but it doubtless cemented the railroad's decision to rely on the Due Process
Clause, which had by then been found to protect corporations as "persons." See Wildenthal, Lost
Compromise, supra note 9, at 1086 n.132.
255 Chicago B&Q, 166 U.S. at 233-41; id at 258-59 (Brewer, J., dissenting) (agreeing with
majority on this point). Chief Justice Fuller did not participate in Chicago B&Q, id at 263, but he
soon indicated his agreement with its holding on this point, by joining silently in Justice Harlan's
opinion for the Court reaffirming it in Norwood v. Baker, 172 U.S. 269,277 (1898).
256 Compare Chicago B&Q, 166 U.S. at 241-58, with id at 258-63 (Brewer, J., dissenting).
257 U.S. CoNsT. amend. V ("No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.").
258 See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516,534-35 (1884); supra Part ll.B.
25 9 See Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 105 (1878); supra Part II.B; Wildenthal, Lost
Compromise, supra note 9, at Part IV.
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just compensation is arguably not a procedural guarantee at all, but rather a
substantive right, and thus not properly within the concept of due process.
The obvious explanation for Chicago B&Q is the Court's well-known and
overriding concern during this era with economic liberty and the defense of
business and property interests. Mere logic and consistency were no match. On the
very same day the Court decided Chicago B&Q, it squarely endorsed the doctrine
of economic substantive due process for the first time, inAllgeyer v. Louisiana.260
Justice Field, who retired later that year at age eighty-one,261 must have been very
pleased at this double-barreled vindication (though only partial and implicit with
regard to incorporation) of his dissenting views in both Slaughter-House and
O 'Neil.
It was most fitting that Justice Harlan-the lone dissenter in Hurtado and the
great champion of incorporation-wrote the opinion of the Court in Chicago
B&Q.262 He would soon have occasion to chide his brethren for their inconsistency
in failing to support incorporation of other Bill of Rights guarantees, noting tartly
that "it would seem that the protection of private property is of more consequence
than the protection of the life and liberty of the citizen. '263 In Chicago B&Q,
however, he was obviously bound by the need to reflect his colleagues' views and
conform to precedent. Professor Morrison ignored this factor, most unfairly
accusing Harlan of"pass[ing] over another opportunity to assert the doctrine that
the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Bill of Rights." 264 This was, to say the
least, an odd way to characterize Harlan's role in the first case to hold that the
Fourteenth Amendment did indeed protect a privilege specified in the Bill of
Rights. 265
The result of these tensions was a curious text. On the one hand, Justice
Harlan's historical analysis of due process in Chicago B&Q reads, not surprisingly,
much like that of his Hurtado dissent, and was fundamentally inconsistent with the
reasoning and approach of the Hurtado majority.266 On the other hand, the opinion
260 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
261 See OXFORD SUPREME CoURT, supra note 37, at 289, 967.
262 Chicago B&Q, 166 U.S. at 228.
263 Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 614 (1900) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also infra
Part IV. As Professor Curtis has noted, "Harlan was prophetic. As the [Fourteenth] [A]mendment
shrank as a protection of liberties explicitly written into the Bill of Rights, it grew as a protection
of liberty of contract." CURTIS, No STATF, supra note 12, at 195.
264 Morrison, supra note 26, at 152.
265 Morrison also ignored the fact that the Privileges and Immunities Clause did not apply
to the railroad (according to prevailing case law) because of its corporate status. See supra note
254.
266 Compare Chicago B&Q, 166 U.S. at 235-41, with Hurado, 110 U.S. at 539-58 (Harlan,
J., dissenting).
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was amusingly coy about the fact that it was, in reality, incorporating the Taldngs
Clause of the Fifth Amendment267-to the point that the latter provision was treated
like the proverbial elephant in the parlor, not even cited or mentioned.268 The
superfluity issue that the Hurtado majority made so much of was also, like Hurtado
itself, studiously ignored.2 69
In retrospect, Chicago B&Q was the pioneering example of what would later
become known as "selective incorporation. '270 But in historical context, it sheds
more light on the pro-business ideology of that Court than on the theory of
incorporation.
Despite Justice Brewer's alliance with Justices Harlan and Field in 0 Neil, and
his enthusiastic support for incorporating the Takings Clause in Chicago B&Q he
soon abandoned the idea of total incorporation. He wrote the opinion of the Court
in Brown v. New Jersey, rejecting a challenge to a state's procedure for peremptory
267 See, e.g., Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 163-64 (1998) (Chicago B&Q
"made [the Takings Clause] applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment... ").
268 'Me closest Harlan came to hinting at the existence of a federal right to just
compensation, separate from the general guarantee of due process, was to twice note that the
Illinois Constitution contained both guarantees. Chicago B&Q, 166 U.S. at 228, 233. This was in
sharp contrast to his Hurtado dissent, which quite logically cited the explicit guarantee of grand
jury indictment in the Fifth Amendment as evidence for the historical fumdamentality of that right
Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 546 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The railroad was not shy about drawing attention
to the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, and even relied on it as a separate basis for relief in
addition to the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause-a point omitted by Harlan in his
description of the railroad's "general contentions" on appeal. Chicago B&Q, 166 U.S. at 232;
Chicago B&Q Railroad's Brief, supra note 253, at 10. The railroad, in contrast to Harlan's rather
elliptical approach, based its argument quite squarely on the logic of total and textual
incorporation, reminiscent of Tucker's argument in Spies, and even hinted at reliance on the
Privileges and Immunities Clause:
The first ten amendments... recognized and secured to all citizens certain rights, privileges and
immunities essential to their security. The Fifth Amendment, operating only as a limitation upon
the powers of the general government, fell short of giving to the citizen... full protection... so
far as state action was concerned. It imposed no prohibition or limitation upon the power and
authority of the states .... The Fourteenth Amendment was adopted to remedy and correct this
defect in the supreme organic law of the land.... [A]s applied to the appropriation of private
property for public uses, [it] was clearly intended to place the same limitation upon the power of
the states which the Fifth Amendment had placed upon the authority of the Federal government.
Chicago B&Q Railroad's Brief, supra note 253, at 46-47.
269 Professor Curtis aptly described this as the "elegantly simple method courts sometimes
use when precedent seems to preclude the desired result." CURTIS, No STATE, supra note 12, at
189.
270 See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147-50 &n.14 (1968); id at 163-64, 171
(Black, J., joined by Douglas, J., concurring).
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jury challenges in criminal cases. 271 The outcome would probably have been the
same even if the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial had been found to apply, but
Brewer asserted that the Bill of Rights did not apply to the states.272 He offered a
highly restrictive interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment quoting language in
Missouri v. Lewis273 suggesting that states were free to abolish jury trial
altogether. 274 He added that "[t]he State is not tied down by any provision of the
Federal Constitution to the practice and procedure which existed at the common
law.' 2 75 Harlan concurred only in the result.276
IV. THE DAWN OF A NEW CENTURYAND THE END OF AN
AULD SANG:2 77 MAXWELL, PAyTERSON, AND TWINING
At the close of the late CivI War... the question arose whether provision
should not be made by constitutional amendments to secure against
attack by the States the rights, privileges, and immunities which, by the
original Amendments, had been placed beyond the power of the United
States or any Federal agency to impair or destroy ... The privileges and
immunities mentioned in the original Amendments, and universally
regarded as our heritage of liberty from the common law, were thus
secured [by the Fourteenth Amendment] to every citizen of the United
States and placed beyond assault by any government, Federal or
state .... 278
The final decade of Justice Harlan's life and career on the Supreme Court saw
the most definitive blows yet to the incorporation theory, blows from which it
would not shakily recover until more than fifty years later. In Maxwell v. Dow,279
a Utah defendant Charles Maxwell, appealed from a robbery conviction rendered
271 175 U.S. 172,175-77 (1899).
272 Id. at 174.
273 101 U.S. 22 (1880); see also Wildenthal, Lost Compromise, supra note 9, at Part IV.
274 Brown, 175 U.S. at 175 (quoting Lewis, 101 U.S. at 31).
275 Id.; see also id. at 174-75 (citing, e.g., Cruikshank and Hurtado).
276 Ia at 177. The decision was otherwise unanimous. Field, having retired in 1897, died in
1899 before Brown was decided. See id at 172; OXFORD SuPREE COURT, supra note 37, at 289.
277 See NIGEL TRANTER, THE STORY OF SCOTLAND 203 (1987) (noting that the Earl of
Seafield, upon the dissolution of the Scottish Parliament in 1707 by the Treaty of Union with
England, commented, "There's an end to an auld sang!"); id. at 195-204 (ch. 16, "The End of an
Auld Sang").
278 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 121-22 (1908) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
279 176 U.S. 581 (1900).
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by a jury of eight rather than twelve o80 The Court, in an opinion by Justice
Rufus W. Peckham speaking for all of his colleagues save Harlan, acknowledged
"no doubf'281 that in federal court this would violate the Sixth Amendment right
to criminal jury trial.282 And for the first time, a majority gave at least somewhat
extended treatment to the issue whether that and other guarantees of the Bill of
Rights also bind the states via either the Privileges and Immunities or Due Process
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.283 But Peckham concluded by rejecting
Maxwell's claim, and his opinion was a disaster.
The Court recited Justice Miller's list of privileges and immunities in
Slaughter-House-including, provocatively, the rights of peaceable assembly and
habeas corpus284-but noted that the "right... claimed here, was not
mentioned," 285 and therefore concluded, rather smugly, that "we may suppose it
was... not covered by the amendment."286 This was hardly reasonable, since
Miller had expressly noted the merely illustrative nature of his list.287 The majority
also made no attempt to explain why jury trial should be treated differently from
peaceable assembly, which, as it had just noted, was "mentioned." At most, the
Court succeeded in demonstrating that Slaughter-House had no specific bearing on
the issue ofjury trial, which, of course, it did not Neither did Cruikshank It was not
essential to either of those decisions to reach any conclusion regarding
incorporation of the Bill of Rights.288 Yet the Maxwell Court asserted, with absurd
exaggeration, that "if all these rights are included in the phrase 'privileges and
immunities' of citizens of the United States... then the sovereignty of the
280 Id. at 583. Maxwell also protested his prosecution by information rather than by grand
jury indictment, claiming that Hurtado, which involved only the Due Process Clause, had not
settled the issue whether that right was encompassed by the Privileges and Immunities Clause. The
Court made short shrift of that argument treating Hurtado as settling the issue for all purposes
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 584-85.
281 Id. at 586.
282 U.S. CONsT. amend. VI ('In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to ... trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law....!).
2 83 See Maxwell, 176 U.S. at 587-602 (analyzing issue under Privileges and Immunities
Clause); id at 602-05 (analyzing issue under Due Process Clause).
284 Id. at 590-91.
285 Id at 591.
286 Id.
2 87 Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 79 ("ventur[ing] to suggestsome" of the rights
protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause) (emphasis added); see also Tribe, Saenz, supra
note 13, at 183-84 n.330; Wildenthal, Lost Compromise, supra note 9, at Part II.C.
2 88 See Wildenthal, Lost Compromise, supra note 9, at Parts II and HII.C.
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state... has been entirely destroyed, and the Slaughter-House [C]ases and...
Cruikshank are all wrong, and should be overruled." 289
Aside from such dodgy misuse of precedent,2 90 Justice Peckham offered the
following rather mind-numbing example of formalistic hair-splitting:
In none [of the first eight amendments] are [the rights they guarantee] privileges or
immunities granted and belonging to the individual as a citizen of the United States, but
they are secured to all persons as against the Federal government, entirely irrespective
of such citizenship. As the individual does not enjoy them as a privilege of citizenship
of the United States, therefore, when the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the
abridgment by the States of those privileges or immunities which he enjoys as such
citizen, it is not correct or reasonable to say that it covers and extends to certain rights
which he does not enjoy by reason of his citizenship, but simply because those rights
exist in favor of all individuals as against Federal governmental powers.291
The argument seems to be that since the Bill of Rights generally protects aliens
who come within the jurisdiction of the United States,292 as well as American
citizens, such rights are not an exclusive attribute of citizenship. This was lawyerly
nonsense of the worst sort, as Professor Amar has amply demonstrated.293 One
turns with relief to the refreshing common sense of Justice Black: "What more
precious 'privilege' of American citizenship could there be than that privilege to
2 89 Maxwell, 176 U.S. at 593.
290 To be sure, as this article and its predecessor have discussed, there were by this time quite
a few cases rejecting the idea of incorporation, and Justice Peckham, not surprisingly, made use
of them. For example, he quoted verbatim almost the entire opinion of the Court in Walker v.
Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1876), see Maxwell, 176 U.S. at 594-95, and he also quoted and discussed
at great length Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22 (1880), see Maxwell, 176 U.S. at 598-601. See
Wildenthal, Lost Compromise, supra note 9, at Part Ill.B (discussing Walker) and Part IV
(discussing Lewis).
291 Maxwell, 176 U.S. at 595-96.
292 One should use the word "generally" with caution, in view of the Court's recent,
outrageous decision in Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 471
(1999) (upholding federal statute depriving courts ofjurisdiction to entertain claims by permanent
resident aliens that they were targeted for deportation because ofpolitical affiliations protected by
First Amendment).
2 93 See AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 12, at 169-71,362-63 nn.19-27; Amar, supra
note 12, at 1222-23. Amar was responding to Professor Louis Henkin, who had earlier echoed
this "technical objection" to incorporation. Cf Louis Henkin, "Selective Incorporation" in the
Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YALE L.J. 74, 78 n.16 (1963); AMAR, BILLOFRIGHTS, supra note 12,
at 362 n.19 (noting origins of argument in Maxwell). But cf. Douglas G. Smith, Reconstruction
or Reaffirmation?: Review of "The Bill of Rights: Creation andReconstruction, "8 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 167, 187-88 (1999) (questioning Amar's resolution of the issue).
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claim the protections of our great Bill of Rights?"294 The fact that such rights are
also enjoyed by foreigners visiting our shores would be a truly bizarre reason to
allow the states to deny them even to American citizens.2 95 In any event, to the
extent one relies on the original understanding, Professor Amar showed that those
who proposed and adopted the Fourteenth Amendment in fact believed, rightly or
wrongly, that only citizens could claim the protection of the Bill of Rights.296
2 9 4 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 166 (1968) (Black, J., joined by Douglas, J.,
concurring). As Justice Harlan noted in Maxwell:
In order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for
the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to
themselves and their posterity, the political community known as the People of the United States
ordained and established the Constitution... ; and every member of that political community was
a citizen of the United States. It was that community that adopted, in the mode prescribed by the
Constitution, the first ten amendments; and what they had in view by so doing was to make it
certain that the privileges and immunities therein specified... could never be impaired or
destroyed by the National Government.
Maxwell, 176 U.S. at 608 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Or, as Maxwell himself succinctly argued: "If
these rights, privileges, and immunities, did not pertain to the people as citizens of the United
States, it is difficult to see in what relation they did belong to them." Brief for Plaintiff in Error
[i.e., Maxwell, the defendant at trial] at 8, Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900) [hereinafter
Maxwell Defendant's Brief].
295 As Amar stated so well:
In ordinary, everyday language we often speak of the United States Constitution and Bill of Rights
as declaring and defining rights of Americans as Americans. Surely our Constitution is not
centrally about declaring, say, the rights of Germans qua Germans, or the Chinese qua
Chinese.... Surely the fact that Americans may often extend many benefits of our Bill [of Rights]
to, say, resident aliens-for reasons of prudence, principle, or both-does not alter the basic fact
that these rights are paradignatically rights of and for American citizens. Indeed, others may enjoy
certain benefits only insofar as they interact with American citizens, typically because they either
live on soil governed by American citizens or do things with important effects on American
citizens. Peripheral applications of the Bill [of Rights] should not obscure its core.
AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 12, at 170; see also Amar, supra note 12, at 1222.
296 See AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 12, at 170-71; Amar, supra note 12, at 1222-23.
I happen to strongly disagree with that view of the protective scope of the Bill of Rights itself, but
that issue need not be pursued here. On the other hand, the limitation of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause's protection to citizens seems clearly dictated by its text. I agree with Amar,
however, that this is not grounds for undue concern, because (1) aliens, like all "persons" within
American jurisdiction, enjoy the protection of the Due Process Clause, which is properly read to
incorporate all procedural guarantees of the Bill of Rights, see supra Part I.B, (2) they are also
covered by the Equal Protection Clause, under which states must 'justify any discrimination
between citizens and aliens," and (3) "aliens may sometimes be able to present themselves as third
party beneficiaries of citizen rights," e.g., an alien's right to speak may be protected as a corollary
of the citizen's right to hear. See AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 12, at 364-65 n.42; Amar,
supra note 12, at 1226 n.153. I would add the preemption principle under which states are
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Equally deficient was the Court's treatment of the Fourteenth Amendment's
legislative history. Faced with Maxwell's invocation of Senator Howard's famous
and uncontradicted 1866 speech,297 the majority casually dismissed it with the
comment that "[w]hat speeches were made by other Senators and...
Representatives... is not stated ... nor... what construction was given to it, if any,
by other members of Congress."298 The majority referred to Howard's address
merely as "the speech of one of the Senators of the United States, made in the
Senate when the proposed Fourteenth Amendment was under consideration by that
body .... 299 Yet Maxwell's brief had pointed out that Howard was not merely
"one of the Senators" but rather was a member of the joint House-Senate committee
that prepared and reported the Amendment, and was entrusted with formally
presenting it to the Senate on the committee's behalf.300 Nor could his exhaustive
and lengthy speech properly be dismissed as casual remarks uttered in the course
of debate.301
Eight years later, in Twining v. New Jersey,302 the Court, in an opinion by
Justice William H. Moody, had clearly grown tired of the debate and relied mainly
on the now-crushing weight of precedent.303 Twining excluded the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination from the scope of the Fourteenth
Amendment.304 In a sense, of course, this was logically compelled by prior
generally prohibited from discriminating against aliens who have been legally admitted to the
United States under federal law. See, e.g., Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1 (1982) (holding that a state
university may not deny certain domiciled nonimmigrant aliens in-state tuition status on an equal
basis with domiciled citizens).
297 See supra note 115.
2 98 Maxwell, 176 U.S. at 601.
299 Id.
30 0 Maxwell Defendant's Brief, supra note 294, at 9-10.
301 Id at 10-12 (quoting speech at length). Maxwell pointed out that Howard's speech "sets
out clearly and forcibly" the need for and purpose of the Amendment. Id. at 12.
302 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
303 See supra text accompanying notes 2-7 (quoting majority opinion). Midway between
Maxwell and Twining, Justice Peckham wrote the Court's opinion in West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S.
258, 261-67 (1904), holding that the Fourteenth Amendment did not incorporate the right of a
criminal defendant "to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
Justice Harlan alone dissented, without opinion. West, 194 U.S. at 267. Perhaps he was getting
tired too.
304 See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall ... be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself... "). The facts of Twining, a state fraud prosecution, raised only the
narrower issue whether, even assuming a privilege against self-incrimination, the trial judge erred
by instructing the jury that it might draw unfavorable inferences from the failure of Albert
Twining's codefendant, David Comell, to testify in response to a specific accusation made against
him. The judge also pointed out to the jury Twining's failure to take the stand in his own defense,
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decisions, as Justice Harlan had repeatedly warned, starting with his parade of
horribles in Hurtado.305 Moody now saluted this foresight, noting that "Mr. Justice
Harlan, in his dissent in each of these cases, pointed out that the inexorable logic of
the reasoning of the court was to allow the states... to compel any person to be a
witness against himself."30 6 One can only try to imagine Harlan's reaction upon
reading the draft opinion.
"Is [the privilege against self-incrimination]," asked the Twining Court; "a
fundamental principle of liberty and justice which inheres in the very idea of free
government and is the inalienable right of a citizen of such a government?" 30 7
Incredibly, it said no.308 Justice Moody commented very tellingly that this shield
for the inviolable dignity of the human mind, so painfully won by the British in
response to the infamous abuses of the Star Chamber,3 09 "cannot be ranked
with.., the inviolability of private property." 310 That was evidently enough for the
majority to distinguish Twining from Chicago B&Q. Justice Harlan protested in
vain that compulsory self-incrimination, as the Court itself had suggested years
before,311 was "abhorrent to the instincts of Americans... and a weapon of
despotic power which could not abide the pure atmosphere ofpolitical liberty and
personal freedom .... ",312
Justice Harlan's lonely dissents in Maxwell and Twining have the eloquence of
long and weary struggle. He asked in Maxwell, with straightforward logic any
layperson could follow:
while discounting the significance of that. See Twining, 211 U.S. at 79-83, 90-91. Twining and
Cornell both appealed their convictions on this basis, and the Supreme Court found it unnecessary
"to consider whether.., there is any difference in the situation of the two defendants. It is
assumed, in respect of each, that the jury were instructed that they might draw an unfavorable
inference against him from his failure to testify... ." Id at 90. The Court found it appropriate to
first resolve whether the privilege applied to the states at all, thus avoiding any need to resolve its
scope or application to the facts at bar. Id. at 91, 114. Cf id at 115-17 (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(complaining at some length about majority's decision to address issues in that order).
3 05 See supra Part II.B.
306 Twining, 211 U.S. at 112.
307 Id. at 106.
30 8 See id. at 106-14.
309 See id at 123 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (referring to "the Star Chamber method of
compelling an accused to be a witness against himself'); see also, e.g., IRVING BRANT, THE BiLL
OF RIGHTS: ITs ORIGIN AND MEANING 380-85 (1965) (discussing the Star Chamber and the history
of the privilege).
310 Twining, 211 U.S. at 113.
311 See id. at 123-24 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting and discussing Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616 (1886)). Boyd, ofcourse, involved the Fifth Amendment's direct application to the
federal government.
312 Twining, 211 U.S. at 127 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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[I]f, prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, it was one of the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States that they should not be tried for crime in any
court organized or existing under national authority except by a jury composed of
twelve persons, how can it be that a citizen of the United States may be now tried in a
state court... by eight jurors, when that Amendment expressly declares that "no State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States"? 3 13
Harlan pointed out that the Court's reasoning left it powerless in the event "a
state should prohibit the free exercise of religion; or abridge the freedom of speech
or of the press," and he went on to summarize the entire Bill of Rights. 3 14 He
wound up with a provocative hypothetical involving the establishment of religion:
Suppose the State of Utah should amend its Constitution and make the Mormon religion
the established religion of the State, to be supported by taxation on all the people of
Utah. Could its right to do so, as far as the Constitution of the United States is
concerned, be gainsaid under the principles of the opinion just delivered? ... [C]ould
not the [majority] opinion herein be cited as showing that the right to the free exercise
of religion was not a privilege of a "citizen of the United States" within the meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment?3 15
Professor Amar, very surprisingly, used the latter passage to suggest that
Justice Harlan may not have viewed the Establishment Clause as being properly
incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment.3 16 But Harlan's hypothetical, chosen
to illustrate the dangers of not binding the states to the Bill of Rights, involved what
313 Maxwell, 176 U.S. at 612 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
314 Id. at 615 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
3 15 Id. at 615-16 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
3 16 See AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 12, at 229; Arnar, supra note 12, at 1271-72.
Amar has questioned whether the Establishment Clause can properly be viewed as incorporated
in the Fourteenth Amendment See AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 12, at 246-57. But see Kurt
T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Establishment Clause: The Rise of the Nonestablishment
Principle, 27 ARz. ST. L.J. 1085 (1995) (analyzing powerful reasons to conclude that it is
properly incorporated); see also Andrew Koppelman, AkhilAmar and the Establishment Clause,
33 U. RIcH. L. REV. 393 (1999). Harlan's Maxwell dissent, contrary to Amar's interpretation, is
in fact strong evidence that the Establishment Clause was viewed in the late nineteenth century
as properly incorporated, at least by those who generally favored incorporation. Senator Thomas
M. Norwood (D-Ga.) and Rep. James B. Beck (D-Ky.), among the members of Congress
embracing incorporation (and an incorporationist reading of Slaughter-House) in the early 1870s,
expressly referred to the Establishment Clause as being among the Bill of Rights guarantees
protected by the Amendment. See 2 CONG. REC. 342 (Dec. 19,1873) (Rep. Beck); id. at app. 241
(Apr. 30 & May 4, 1874) (Sen. Norwood). See generally Wildenthal, Lost Compromise, supra
note 9, at Part mI.A.1.
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would most apparently be a violation of the Establishment Clause.317 Aar argued
that Harlan omitted nonestablishment from his catalog of Bill of Rights
guarantees, 318 but the above-quoted hypothetical itself paraphrased the key
language of the clause concerning "established religion. ' 319
Indeed, Justice Harlan's broader point was that failing to incorporate any one
constitutional guarantee tended to imply permission for states to violate others. But
all those guarantees, he maintained, "are equally protected by the Constitution. No
judicial tribunal has authority to say that some of them may be abridged by the
states while others may not be abridged." 320 Thus, in Twining, "constrained by a
sense of duty,"321 Harlan declared that
as immunity from self-incrimination was recognized in the Fifth Amendment... and
placed beyond violation by any Federal agency, it should be deemed one of the
immuities of citizens of the United States which the Fourteenth Amendment in express
317 Amar made much of the fact that Harlan's hypothetical involved taxation to support
religion, rather than a mere symbolic declaration, implying that this suggested a Free Exercise
Clause rather than an Establishment Clause violation. See AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 12,
at 229; Amar, supra note 12, at 1272. But this seems rather strained. It is doubtful that mere
expenditure of public funds for religious purposes, without more, would be found to violate the
Free Exercise Clause standing alone. Harlan's own suggestion that his hypothetical might violate
the Free Exercise Clause is best explained by the common tendency to lump together the two
religion clauses. See infra note 319.
318 See AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 12, at 229; Amar, supra note 12, at 1271.
3 19 Maxwell, 176 U.S. at 615 (Harlan, J., dissenting). It thus misreads (or at least overreads)
Harlan to say that he "deci[ded] to characterize this hypothetical ... as violating free exercise
rather than nonestablishment principles." AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 12, at 229 (emphasis
added); see also Amar, supra note 12, at 1272. Amar characterized this "decision" as "subtle but
significant." AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 12, at 229; see also Amar, supra note 12, at 1272.
So subtle as to be nonexistent, in my view. Harlan implied a violation of the Establishment Clause
at least equally strongly (more strongly, in my view), by referring explicitly to Utah's hypothetical
decision to "make the Mormon religion the established religion of the State." Maxwell, 176 U.S.
at 615 (Harlan, J., dissenting). It has long been common to lump together the two religion
guarantees, and to treat the Establishment Clause as merely providing further protection for
religious freedom in general, which indeed it does. See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S.
1, 63 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (in an Establishment Clause case involving a subsidy of
schoolchildren's bus fares and no plausible Free Exercise Clause violation, arguing that the
subsidy should be struck down, and referring to the need "to prevent the first experiment upon our
liberties; ... [w]e should not be less strict to keep strong and untamished the one side of the shield
of religious freedom than we have been of the other").
32 0 Maxwell, 176 U.S. at 616 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
321 Twining, 211 U.S. at 114 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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terms forbids any State from abridging-as much so, for instance, as the right of free
speech .... 322
Justice Harlan's references to freedom of speech in both Maxwell and Twining
were not academic. The year before Twining, he dissented yet again in defense of
the Bill of Rights. In Patterson v. Colorado,323 an amazing decision remarkably
little-noted today, the majority dismissed a newspaper publisher's challenge to a
Colorado Supreme Court order convicting him of criminal contempt and fining him
one thousand dollars--without even allowing a defense oftruth-for criticizing one
of its rulings.324 The author of the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion was none other
than Justice Holmes, the reputed "Great Dissenter" and supposed defender of free
expression. 325 He skirted the incorporation issue by assuming arguendo that the
First Amendment applied.326 Even on that assumption, the Court held, in reliance
on Blackstone and the old common law of criminal libel, that only prior restraints
on the press, not subsequent punishments, were forbidden, and that "the subsequent
punishment may extend as well to the true as to the false."327
322 Id. at 124 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
323 205 U.S. 454 (1907).
324 Thomas M. Patterson was the publisher of the Denver Times and the Rocky Mountain
News, and Democratic U.S. Senator from Colorado from 1901 to 1907. He was incensed at the
state court majority for invalidating, on highly questionable grounds, a recent referendum granting
home rule to Denver, thereby nullifying several local elections. His papers ridiculed the state
judges in editorials, cartoons, and letters, as tools of a Republican political machine controlled by
utility interests. See id at 458-59; People v. News-Times Publishing Co., 84 P. 912 (Colo. 1906),
writ of error dismissed for want ofjurisdiction sub nom. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454
(1907); id at 956 (Steele, J., dissenting); see also BRANT, supra note 309, at 393-94; DAVID M.
RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTrEN YEARS 132-34 (1997); U.S. ELEcnoNs, supra note
159, at 787.
325 See, e.g., SHELDON M. NOVICK, HONORABLE JUSTICE: THE LIFE OF OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES 321-32 (1989) (discussing Holmes's role in World War I free speech cases); RABBAN,
supra note 324, at 279-98, 342-71 (same).
326 See Patterson, 205 U.S. at 462:
We leave undecided the question whether there is to be found in the Fourteenth Amendment a
prohibition similar to that in the First. But even if we were to assume that freedom of speech and
freedom of the press were protected from abridgments on the part not only of the United States but
also of the States, still we should be far from the conclusion that [Patterson] would have us reach.
327 Id. (citing, e.g., 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *150); see also RABBAN,
supra note 324, at 133-34.
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Justice Harlan, by contrast; not only found the First Amendment binding on the
states,328 he boldly rejected the old, restrictive, common-law view of press freedom:
I cannot assent to th[e] view... that the legislature may impair or abridge the rights of
a free press and of free speech whenever it thinks that the public welfare requires that
to be done. The public welfare cannot override constitutional privileges, and if the rights
of free speech and of a free press are, in their essence, attributes of national citizenship,
as I think they are, then neither Congress nor any State since the adoption of the
fourteenth Amendment can, by legislative enactments or by judicial action, impair or
abridge them. In my judgment the action of the court below was in violation of the
rights of free speech and a free press as guaranteed by the Constitution....
... It is, I think, impossible to conceive of liberty, as secured by the Constitution
against hostile action, whether by the Nation or by the States, which does not embrace
the right to enjoy free speech and the right to have a free press.329
These were striking words indeed from a Justice in his twilight years, coming
more than a decade before Judge Learned Hand's groundbrealdng opinion in the
Masses case330 and Justice Holmes's "great dissent' inAbrams v. United States.33 1
They echoed one of the core imperatives of the Civil War-Era Republicans who
gave birth to the Fourteenth Amendment.332 It was not until a generation after
Justice Harlan's cry in the wilderness in Patterson that the Court began to haltingly
re-incorporate the First Amendment into the Fourteenth,333 thereby beginning the
slow and difficult journey back toward the lost compromise of Slaughter-House.
328 See Patterson, 205 U.S. at 463-64 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
329 Id. at 465 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Brewer also dissented, in a brief separate
opinion, but he stated that he did so "[w]hile not concurring in the views expressed by Mr. Justice
Harlan." Id. (Brewer, J., dissenting). Brewer felt the Court should have granted the writ of error
and addressed the case more fully on the merits, since Patterson's claim was not "a frivolous one."
Id.
330 See Masses Publ'g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y.) (Hand, J.), rev'd, 246 F. 24
(2d Cir. 1917). This was the shortlived district court ruling that attempted to put a speech-
protective gloss on wartime sedition laws, and which has been credited with helping to lay the
foundation ofthe modem constitutional law of free speech. See GUNTm & SuLIuvAN, supra note
12, at 1044-50; GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNEDHAND: THEMANAND TBE JUDGE 151-70 (1994);
Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine: Some
Fragments ofHistory, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719 (1975); see also RABBAN, supra note 324, at 255-69.
331 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., joined by Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also
RABBAN, supra note 324, at 342-71.
332 See Wildenthal, Lost Compromise, supra note 9, at 1075 n.87 (collecting scholarship
demonstrating that concerns about freedom of speech were central to the proposal and adoption
of the Fourteenth Amendment).
333 See infra note 376.
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John Marshall Harlan died in office on October 14, 1911, not quite three years
after Twining was decided,334 seemingly the last defender of the incorporationist
faith. That same year, an ambitious young lawyer named Hugo L. Black-born in
a frontier hamlet called Harlan "in the hills of Alabama in the troublesome times of
Reconstruction ' 335 -was appointed police court judge in Birmingham,
Alabama.336
V. THE BEGINNINGS OF A NEW SONG: 337
1947, 1969, 1999, AND BEYOND
The story of the Fourteenth Amendment is part of the great story of
libery .... It is a story well worth telling, particularly today, when study
of the history of liberty is neglected and when guarantees are likely to be
dismissed as mindless technicalities. For individualsforfamilies, andfor
nations, the stories we tell about our past are important ways of
understanding our identity.33
8
This article's reappraisal of the early debate over incorporation demonstrates
that Justice Black's 1947 Adamson dissent339 was neither a radical innovation nor
an anachronistic afterthought. It appeared "activist" in ajudicial sense only because
of the weight of erroneous precedent standing in the way. The vociferous denials
of incorporation by Justice Black's twentieth-century opponents-Justice
Frankfurter, Professors Fairman and Morrison, and (most ironically) the second
Justice Harlan prominent among them-were the true anachronisms.
Let us pause and look back over these forty years of debates and decisions from
1868 to 1908, in the halls of Congress and at the bar of the Supreme Court.3 40 What
does that history tell us about the argument of Professors Fairman341 and
334 See OXFORD SUPREME COURT, supra note 37, at 968; Twining, 211 U.S. at 78.
335 BLAC, supra note 182, at 65; see also NEWMAN, supra note 85, at 3; DUNNE, supra note
85, at 85-89. Justice Black's birth year of 1886 was actually a bit past the traditionally identified
end of Reconstruction, in 1877, but not by much.
336 See NEWMAN, supra note 85, at 29-30; DUNNE, supra note 85, at 97-99.
337 Seesupra note 277. Scotland's new song began on July 1, 1999, with the opening of the
first Scottish Parliament in almost three hundred years, a reminder that constitutional moments
need not be lost forever, and that even the century and one-third that have elapsed since the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment are not so very long by the standards of America's
ancestral lands. See A Moment Anchored in Scotland's History, The Scotsman, July 2, 1999, at 1.
338 Curtis, Resurrecting, supra note 12, at 4.
339 See supra note 28.
340 See generally supra Parts II-IV; Wildenthal, Lost Compromise, supra note 9.
341 See Fairman, supra note 27, at 116 & n.306, 132-34, 137.
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Morrison 342 that incorporation was, on the whole, a theory mysteriously missing
in action from the discourse of judges and lawyers of that time? It has refuted that
argument as to the judges. That incorporation was ultimately rejected by the courts
of that era is undeniable. But it adds unwarranted insult to injury to disparage the
theory as not even seriously entertained. The judges supporting incorporation were
right, and they explained why quite convincingly. Their opponents were wrong, and
furthermore, rarely bothered to engage the supporters in any serious discussion of
the issue. As we all know, it is ultimately having five votes, not the best argument
on the merits, that ensures victory on the Supreme Court. The anti-incorporationists
had those five votes in 1892, as they did in 1947.343
What about the lawyers? Professor Morrison suggested that incorporation was
simply not "abroad" as an idea among them.344 One might begin to address this
argument by noting that most constitutional claims involving the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Bill of Rights are brought by convicted criminals or others
likely to be without substantial means. Hiring a lawyer to take an appeal (especially
to the Supreme Court) was then, as it is today, an expensive proposition. Today, the
indigent defendant is provided with a free attorney at trial and on the first appeal of
right,345 but that long postdates the late nineteenth century. Today, unlike then,
there is a veritable army of public interest lawyers and organizations ready to
litigate pro bono almost any constitutional claim of broad interest.3 46 Today, many
such claims are brought pursuant to federal habeas corpus jurisdiction and the
federal Declaratory Judgment Act. Habeas corpus relief in federal court for persons
held in state custody was statutorily created in 1867,3 4 7 but it was not until well into
the twentieth century that the statute was interpreted to go beyond challenges to the
jurisdiction of the state court, to reach most violations of federal constitutional
342 See Morrison, supra note 26, at 147 (asserting "failure of... counsel" in Hurtado "to
bring up the incorporation argument"); id. at 151 (asserting that "[i]n view of the long line of
cases... in which the question could have been raised... the conclusion is irresistible that it was
not generally supposed that the [Fourteenth] Amendment incorporated the Bill of Rights"); id at
160 (again asserting repeated "failure of counsel .. even to raise the question" and "lack of
any... understanding [in favor of incorporation] on the part of... legal contemporaries").
343 See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947); O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323
(1892).
344 See Morrison, supra note 26, at 151.
345 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353
(1963).
346 See, e.g., RABBAN, supra note 324, at 299-341 (describing origins of American Civil
Liberties Union and modem civil liberties movement during and after World War 1).
347 Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254).
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rights.348 The Declaratory Judgment Act was not passed until 1934.34 9
Furthermore, many nineteenth-century lawyers had little or no training in
constitutional law, if they had even attended law school at all.350 And there is
always, finally, sheer incompetence, which demonstrably afflicted the lawyering
(even at the Supreme Court level) in at least three of the cases discussed in this
article and its predecessor.351
But enough of excuses. When we survey the arguments nineteenth-century
lawyers actually made, what do we find? We find some of them expressly
advocating or at least accepting incorporation during the five years after the
Fourteenth Amendment's adoption in 1868,352 including in Slaughter-House, the
first Supreme Court decision to address the scope of the Amendment.353 Dean
Richard Aynes has noted that, of the four legal scholars who seem to have written
constitutional law treatises contemporary with the adoption of the Fourteenth
348 See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAw oF FEDERAL COURTS § 53, at 350-54(5th ed. 1994);
see also Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277,285-86 (1992) (plurality opinion of Thomas, J.,joinedby
Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia, J.); id. at 299 (O'Connor, J., joined by Blackmun and Stevens, JJ.,
concurring in the judgment).
349 Act of June 14, 1934, ch. 512,48 Stat. 955 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202). Prior
to the Court's decision in Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249
(1933), it was thought that the constitutionally required "case or controversy," see U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 2, might be lacking in lawsuits seeking only declaratory judgments. See WRIGHT, supra
note 348, § 12, at 66-67; id., § 100, at 712.
350 See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDmAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 606-07 (2d ed. 1985)
(noting that the overwhelming majority of lawyers in the mid-nineteenth century were self-taught
or trained by clerking in law offices, though the trend toward law school education became strong
by 1900); iad at 614 (noting that constitutional law was, for a time, removed entirely from the
Harvard curriculum under Dean Christopher Columbus Langdell); Paul D. Carrington, Law as
"The Common Thoughts ofMen " The Law-Teaching and Judging of Thomas Mdntyre Cooley,
49 STAN. L. REv. 495, 515-16 (1997) (noting that "Langdell did not regard [constitutional law]
as law at all" and that it was not taught at Harvard during the 1870s). Furthermore, the multitude
of electronic and print resources that modem lawyers rely on to keep up to date with court
decisions-including, it sometimes seems, hanging on every nuance of phrasing uttered by the
Supreme Court-did not then exist.
351 This is illustrated, for example, by the attomey in Twitchell v. Pennsylvania, 74 U.S.
(7 Wall.) 321 (1869), vho not only failed to invoke the incorporation theory on behalf of his
death-row client, but neglected (even while claiming a due process violation) to invoke the newly
ratified Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. See Wildenthal, Lost Compromise, supra
note 9, at Part II.A; see also supra note 129 (discussing Presser Defendant's Brief, supra note
129); supra note 247 (discussing McElvaine Appellant's Brief, supra note 247).
352 See Wildenthal, Lost Compromise, supra note 9, at Part lI.A.
3 53 See id at Part II.D (discussing Slaughter-House briefs).
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Amendment, three strongly supported incorporation.354 In the early 1870s, we find
lawyers in Congress, across the political spectrum, embracing incorporation.3 55 All
of this was overlooked by Professors Fairman and Morrison. One legal
commentator, writing in 1879 and criticizing the narrow reading of the Privileges
and Immunities Clause which had by then taken hold on the Court, observed:
Ninety-nine out of every hundred educated men, upon reading [the Clause], would at
first say that it forbade a state to make or enforce a law which abridged any privilege or
immunity whatever of one who was a citizen of the United States; and it is only by an
effort of ingenuity that any other sense can be discovered that it can be forced to
bear.356
Beaten back by the Court's unexplained and gratuitous undermining of the
incorporation theory in cases like Walker and Cruikshank357 and with the Court
354 See Aynes, Bingham, supra note 30, at 83-91 (discussing TIMOTHYFARRAR, MANUAL
OFTHE CONSTrrTrioNOFTHEUNIED STATEs (1867 & 3d ed. 1872), GEoRGEW. PASCHAL, THE
CONSTrUTION OF THE UNITED STATES DEFINED AND CAREFULLY ANNOTATED (1868), and JOHN
N. POMEROY, AN INTRODUCION TO THE CONSTIUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNrED STATES (1868));
see also CuRTIs, No STATE, supra note 12, at 172-73 (discussing POMEROY, supra). Cf Aynes,
Bingham, supra note 30, at 91-94 (discussing treatises by Thomas M. Cooley); Wildenthal, Lost
Compromise, supra note 9, at Part IIIA.3 (same).
355 See Wildenthal, Lost Compromise, supra note 9, at Parts IIA and IIIA.1.
356 William L. Royall, The Fourteenth Amendment: The Slaughter-House Cases,
4 SouTHERNL. REv. (N.S.) 558,563 (1879), quoted in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46,75-
76 n.6 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). Royall was no Radical Republican, but rather-like John
Randolph Tucker, see supra Part ll.D-a Democrat and former Confederate. See Aynes, Miller,
supra note 12, at 681-82 & n.398. Royall seemed to accept the conventional anti-incorporationist
reading of Slaughter-House (while disagreeing with Slaughter-House so read), but his reading was
obviously colored by the intervening decisions in Cruikshank and Walker, which he also
discussed, as well as by an unpublished, anti-incorporationist 1878 circuit court decision by Chief
Justice Waite (acting as Circuit Justice). See Royall, supra, at 559-62. Royall mistakenly asserted
that "no one of the distinguished counsel who argued" Slaughter-House "consult[ed] the
proceedings of the Congress which proposed [the Fourteenth] [A]mendment."Id. at 563. But see
Wildenthal, Lost Compromise, supra note 9, at Part II.D. Royall himself offered a very capable
discussion of the legislative history, including the key speeches by Rep. John A. Bingham
(R-Ohio) and Sen. Jacob M. Howard (R-Mich.). See Royall, supra, at 563-75; Wildenthal, Lost
Compromise, supra note 9, at Part I.B. Royall took pains to argue that the incorporationist view
of the Fourteenth Amendment, which he favored, was consistent with "the purest principles of
Democracy" (his capitalization indicating a reference to the political principles of the Democratic
Party). Royall, supra, at 584. He did not cite, however, and may have been unaware of, the
numerous statements by Democratic members of Congress in the early 1870s endorsing not only
the incorporationist view of the Fourteenth Amendment, but also an incorporationist reading of
Slaughter-House. See Wildenthal, Lost Compromise, supra note 9, at Parts II.A and IIA.1.
3 57 See Wildenthal, Lost Compromise, supra note 9, at Parts III.B-IV.
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and the nation generally turning against Reconstruction and any broad reading of
the Reconstruction Amendments,35 8 there was then a bit of a lull. Even in the
Cruikshank litigation, however, Justice Bradley's circuit court opinion squarely
endorsed incorporation. And of the four Supreme Court briefs filed on behalf of the
Cruikshank defendants, who had every incentive to dispute incorporation, only one
did so, while another actually endorsed incorporation. 359
In 1884, we again find incorporation being pressed, via the Due Process
Clause,360 and then via the Privileges and Immunities Clause in 1886,361 1887,362
and the early 1890s. 363 The theory was raised yet again in 1897,364 1899,365
1900,366 1904,367 1907,368 and 1908.369 And those were just the occasions that
produced significant discussion of the issue on the Supreme Court.370 Dean Aynes
has noted that several leading legal scholars in the 1890s supported
incorporation.371 And it was in 1908, the year of Twining and the nadir of the
incorporation theory on the Court, that Horace Flack published his famous
358 See, e.g., Robert D. Goldstein, Blyew: Variations on a Jurisdictional Theme, 41 STAN.
L. REv. 469, 526 (1989) (describing Court as "an ideological and political leader in the reaction
to Reconstruction"); Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81
VA. L. REv. 947, 1088-89 (1995). See generally FONER, supra note 167, at 512-612; Michael W.
McConnell, The Forgotten Constitutional Moment, 11 CONST. COMM. 115 (1994) (discussing the
end of the Reconstruction Era and its relation to the Constitutional Moment theory).
359 See Wildenthal, Lost Compromise, supra note 9, at Part m.C.
360 See supra Part II.B (discussing Hurtado).
361 See supra Part II.C (discussing Presser).
362 See supra Part ll.D (discussing Spies).
363 See supra Part m.A (discussing O'Neil, Eilenbecker, Miller, Kemmler, and McElvaine).
364 See supra Part I.B (discussing Chicago B&Q).
365 See id (discussing Brown).
366 See supra Part IV (discussing Maxwell).
367 See supra note 303 (discussing West).
368 See supra Part IV (discussing Patterson).
369 See id (discussing Twining).
370 See JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF MELVILLEW. FULLER, 1888-1910
166 (1995) (noting that during the late nineteenth century, "[c]riminal defendants frequently
argued that the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment embraced at least
some of the guarantees of the Bill of Rights").
371 See Aynes, Miller, supra note 12, at 682-83 (citing I JOHN W. BURGESS, POLrICAL
SCIENCE AND COMPARATIVE CONSTtrIONAL LAW 228-30 (1890), and WILLIAM D. GUrHRE
LEmniEs ON THE FOURTEET AMENDMENT 58-59 (1898)). Justice Black cited what appears to
have been the same work by Guthrie in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46,73 (1947) (Black,
J., dissenting).
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argument in favor of incorporation, an argument relied upon by Justice Black in
1947.372
One is tempted to ask what more Professors Fairman and Morrison wanted.
This author's conclusion is that the lawyers of the late nineteenth century, in the
context of their time, gave incorporation a pretty good college try. Moreover, they
were fairly persistent in the face of a Supreme Court that repeatedly demonstrated
its indifference or outright hostility. The key voting and equality reforms of the
Reconstruction Amendments were also, after all, treated with indifference or
outright hostility during the late nineteenth century by the Court-and by most of
the nation-and went effectively unenforced until almost a century later. This
makes the failure of incorporation to gain ultimate acceptance during that era less
peculiar, less surprising, and less relevant to its intrinsic merits.
As Professor Curtis has noted, "[flor a brief shining moment during and after
the Civil War, protection of Blacks had been associated with the cause of the Union.
By the mid-1870s protection of Blacks seemed to disrupt national unity, and the
commitment to protection of their rights faded away as quickly as it had come."373
Something similar took place with regard to incorporation. Born in the epic debates
of the 1860s, it enjoyed a brief heyday in the early 1870s. It was a reassuring,
textualist alternative to the radical invitations of nationalist libertarians like Justice
Field. But it got caught up in the general retrenchment of federal power associated
with the end of Reconstruction. Attention was not paid. Care was not taken. For a
conservative Court, zealous in defense of private property and corporate rights, but
indifferent or hostile to individual liberty in the broader sense, incorporation was a
bother. Shoddy, ill-begotten precedents like Walker and Cruikshank provided the
excuse to ignore the true consensus and compromise of Slaughter-House. Justice
Harlan, and to a lesser but still admirable extent Justice Field, saw what was at
stake. But they were only two Justices. And then only one. The moment did not last
Usually, ideas that undergo a fundamental change in acceptance by the legal
order progress gradually over time from radical innovation to conservative verity.
It was somehow the reverse for the incorporation theory. It progressed from being
a minimum, uncontroversial compromise embraced by racist reactionaries and pro-
civil-rights progressives alike in the early 1870s, to a theory widely scorned in the
late 1940s as virtually an attempted constitutional coup d'itat by the four most
liberal Justices on the Court. Two of those Justices-Black and Douglas-survived
into the 1970s, continuing to press the cause, which largely triumphed in substance
though not in strict theory during the Warren Court judicial revolution of the 1960s.
Even then, however, and even today to a large extent, the myth has persisted-at
least among many conservatives and purported adherents of "judicial restraint' and
37 2 See HoRAc E. F-ACK, THE ADO PnON OF THE FOURTEENTH AmENDmENT 94 (1908),
citedin Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46,72 n.5, 109-10 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
373 CuRTIS, No STATE, supra note 12, at 180.
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"original understanding" approaches to constitutional interpretation-that this
revolution was the adventurous, ill-founded, and unwise product of modem activist
judges. In reality, it was, quite the contrary, the vindication-albeit long-overdue
and incomplete-of the understanding embraced by legislators and judges,
visionaries and reactionaries alike, in the 1860s and 1870s.
If 1908 was incorporation's nadir and 1947 a dramatic near-miss, 1969 was its
zenith. The year before, Justices Black and Douglas had noted their satisfaction
with the process of "selective" incorporation, which had "the virtue of having
already worked to make most of the Bill of Rights' protections applicable to the
States"--although, they pointedly added, it was "perhaps less historically
supportable than complete incorporation."374 The Court's 1969 decision in Benton
v. Maryland375 was the capstone and conclusion of that chapter in the incorporation
saga. The case overflowed with historical symbolism and ironies. The Court's
opinion-the last (to date) to incorporate a Bill of Rights guarantee 376 -was written
374 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 171 (1968) (Black, J., joined by Douglas, J.,
concurring); see also BLACK, supra note 182, at 34-42.
375 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
376 See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897)
(incorporating right to just compensation for takings of private property); Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) ("assum[ing]" that freedoms of speech and press are incorporated);
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359,368 (1931) (so holding as to freedom of speech); Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697,707 (1931) (same as to freedom ofpress); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S.
353, 364-66 (1937) (incorporating rights of peaceable assembly and petition); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (same as to free exercise of religion and rule against
establishment of religion); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257,266-73 (1948) (same as to right to public
trial); id at 273 (same as to defendant's "right to reasonable notice of a charge against him," i.e.,
right to be informed of nature and cause of accusation); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28,
33 (1949) (incorporating "security of... privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police ... at the
core of the Fourth Amendment," but not exclusionary rule for evidence seized in violation
thereof); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-60 (1961) (incorporating right to exclusion of
evidence seized in violation of Fourth Amendment); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660,666-
67 (1962) (same as to immunity from cruel and unusual punishments); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335, 342-45 (1963) (same as to right to counsel, including appointed counsel for indigent
defendants); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8-11 (1964) (same as to privilege against self-
incrimination); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400,403 (1965) (same as to right of confrontation);
Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222-23 (1967) (same as to right to speedy trial);
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 17-19 (1967) (same as to right to compulsory process to
obtain favorable witnesses); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148-50 (1968) (same as to right
to criminal jury trial); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784,793-96 (1969) (same as to immunity
from double jeopardy). The Court's incorporation of the right to counsel had its gradual start in
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), but was not fully accomplished until Gideon. The Court
in Robinson appeared to rely on Louisiana e rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947), as
having already incorporated immunity from cruel and unusual punishments. See Robinson, 370
U.S. at 666; see also id. at 675 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Reed's plurality opinion in
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by Justice Thurgood Marshall, the first African-American to ascend the high bench.
Dissenting yet again was the second Justice Harlan,377 whose grandfather, as we
have seen, was a repeated dissenter on the other side of the issue and wrote thefirst
opinion of the Court to hold that a Bill of Rights guarantee fell within the scope of
the Fourteenth Amendment.378 Both, it would seem, lived in the wrong era. And,
of course, the first Justice Harlan's dissent demanding equality under law for
African-Americans was resurrected in a case argued by the future Justice
Marshall. 379
Benton moved far toward embracing, at long last, the logic of total and textual
incorporation. The Court flatly repudiated Palko v. Connecticut,380 the case that
forged the "fundamental fairness" approach to selective incorporation, declaring
that "this Court has 'increasingly looked to the specific guarantees of the [Bill of
Rights]"' 381 in resolving the incorporation issue. "Once it is decided that a
particular Bill of Rights guarantee is 'fundamental to the American scheme of
justice,' the same constitutional standards apply against both the State and Federal
Governments. Palko's roots had thus been cut away years ago. We today only
recognize the inevitable."382 It is, of course, difficult to see why any guarantee
would ever have been enshrined in the Bill of Rights if it were not deemed
"fundamental" by Americans. The only real difference between Benton's approach
and total incorporation is respect for stare decisis with regard to the three Bill of
Rights guarantees still specifically disincorporated in 1969 and today.383
Yet, Benton also carried troubling portents for incorporation. The case was
decided on the very day that Chief Justice Earl Warren stepped down and was
Resweber, however, merely "assum[ed] ... without so deciding' that this immunity was
incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment, and did not speak for the Court in any event. See
Resweber, 329 U.S. at 462 (Reed, J., joined by Vinson, C.J., and Black and Jackson, JJ.).
Furthermore, the majority denied relief to the claimant See id at 465-66 (Reed, J.); id. at 471-72
(Frankfurter, J., concurring [in the judgment]). For a catalog of all twenty-four privileges and
immunities secured by the Bill of Rights, see supra note 106.
37 7 Benton, 395 U.S. at 801-13 (Harlan, J., joined by Stewart, J., dissenting).
3 78 See supra Part u11.B (discussing Chicago B&Q).
379 Compare Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 484 (1954) (Thurgood Marshall
appearing for plaintiffs), with Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552-64 (1896) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). See generally RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN v BOARD
OFEDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALrTY (1975).
380 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
381 Benton, 395 U.S. at 794 (quoting Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18 (1967)).
382 Id. at 795 (quoting Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149).
383 See Edwards v. Elliott, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 532,557 (1874) (civil jury trial); Walker v.
Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90,92-93 (1876) (same); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542,553 (1876)
(right to bear arms); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 264-68 (1886) (same); Hurtado v.
California, 110 U.S. 516,538 (1884) (grandjury indictment).
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succeeded by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, thus depriving the liberals of their
majority on the Court.384 Over the next decade, the majority, while not
disincorporating outright any Bill of Rights guarantee, cut back significantly on the
application to the states of the Sixth Amendment right to criminal jury trial.385
Although there presently seems no danger of any further rollback of incorporation,
one wonders how the Court will resolve the remaining open questions in this area.
These include the three Bill of Rights guarantees that the Court has so far neither
incorporated nor disincorporated,386 and the six other personal rights scattered in
the original Constitution.387
384 See OXFORD SUPREME COURT, supra note 37, at 970. Justice Abe Fortas, generally
regarded as another liberal pillar of the Warren Court, had resigned the month before. See id That
left only Justices Black, Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall among those generally placed in the
liberal wing. Black retired in 1971 and Douglas in 1975. See id at 969-70.
38 5 See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (upholding, 5-4, state court conviction by
non-unanimous verdict, even though five Justices adhered to view that Sixth Amendment required
unanimous verdict in federal court and eight Justices adhered to view that Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment jury guarantees were identical); id. at 366, 369-77 (Powell, J., concurring in the
judgment) (casting swing vote interpreting Fourteenth Amendment as not fully incorporating Sixth
Amendment jury trial guarantee); Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 427 U.S. 618 (1976) (upholding, 5-4,
state procedure requiring initial bench trial of certain crimes, subject to defendant's right to de
novo retrial by jury, while leaving undisturbed precedent finding similar procedure in District of
Columbia invalid under Sixth Amendment); see also Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970)
(ruling that jury of six rather than twelve did not violate Sixth or Fourteenth Amendments). Justice
Marshall, in an opinion that would surely have met the approbation of the elder Justice Harlan,
dissented alone from Williams's dilution ofthe right tojury trial. See Williams, 399 U.S. at 116-17
(Marshall, J., dissenting). The elder Harlan had written the Court's opinion in Thompson v. Utah,
170 U.S. 343, 349-50 (1898) (overruled by Williams), holding, in a criminal case originating
when Utah was still a federal territory directly subject to the Sixth Amendment, that the right
necessarily presupposed ajury of twelve, for reasons rooted in Anglo-American legal history. The
younger Justice Harlan stood by his grandfather on this issue, sharply protesting the Williams
Court's dilution of the Sixth Amendment, though he concurred in the result because of his view
that the Fourteenth Amendment did not incorporate the Sixth. See Williams, 399 U.S. at 117, 122-
29 (Harlan, J., concurring in the result). In case it is not clear from the foregoing, I happen to
strongly agree with both Justices Halan on the Sixth Amendment issue, and with Justice Marshall
and the elder Harlan on the Fourteenth.
386 These are the Third Amendment freedom from quartering of soldiers and the Eighth
Amendment immunities from excessive bail and excessive fines. See supra note 106.
387 These may be numbered as follows: (1) rule against suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2; (2) right to criminal jury trial, id. art. m, § 2, cl. 3;
(3) immunity from liability for treason unless guilty of "levying War against [the United States],
or... adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort,"id § 3, cl. 1; (4) immunity from
conviction for treason "unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on
Confession in open Court," id; (5) immunity from any "Attainder of Treason ... work[ing]
Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attainted," id. § 3, cl. 2;
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To address the former three first, it seems doubtful that the Court will face in
the foreseeable future any issue arising under the Third Amendment's prohibition
of peacetime quartering of soldiers in private homes. With regard to excessive bail
and excessive fines under the Eighth Amendment, it seems hard to believe that the
Court would not incorporate those rights if ever confronted with the issue,
especially given that the remaining Eighth Amendment guarantee, against cruel and
unusual punishments, has long been incorporated. 388 The Court has, in fact,
expressed in dicta an assumption that the Excessive Bail Clause applies to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment. 389 Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and John
Paul Stevens have expressly endorsed incorporation of the Excessive Fines
Clause.390 The Court, in a 1983 opinion by Justice O'Connor, struck down a state's
automatic imposition of a prison term on an indigent defendant for failure to pay a
fine,391 and it recently threw out a federal fine on grounds of excessiveness for the
first time ever.392
With regard to the six guarantees in the Constitution of 1787, the three closely
interlinked provisions dealing with treason seem as unlikely as the Third
Amendment to arise any time soon in a state context.393 The Article H guarantee
and (6) immunity from any religious test for federal office, id art. VI, cl. 3. The original
Constitution also guarantees three individual rights against both federal and state violation:
(1) immunity from bills of attainder, (2) immunity from ex post facto laws, and (3) rule against
grants of nobility. l art. I, § 9, cls. 3, 8, § 10, cl. 1. The amendments provide such dual protection
to another eight rights: (1) prohibition of slavery and involuntary servitude, id amend. XIII, § 1;
(2) right to United States citizenship by birth within United States jurisdiction, id. amend. XIV,
§ 1; (3) right of United States citizens to state citizenship by residence within any state, id;
(4) right not to be deprived of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law," id. amends.
V and XV, § 1; (5) right of United States citizens to vote without regard to "race, color, or
previous condition of servitude," id. amend. XV, § 1; (6) right of United States citizens to vote
without regard to sex, id. amend. XIX, § 1; (7) right of United States citizens to vote in federal
elections without regard to "failure to pay any poll tax or other tax," id amend. XXIV, § 1; and
(8) right of United States citizens aged 18 and older to vote without regard to age, id. amend.
XXVI, § 1. Finally, the Constitution guarantees two individual rights against state but not federal
violation: (1) immunity from impairment of contracts, id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; and (2) right to "equal
protection of the laws," id. amend. XIV, § 1. But see Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,499-500
(1954) (holding that equal protection guarantee applies in substance to federal government).
3 88 See supra note 376.
389 See Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365 (1971).
3 90 See Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 283-84
(1989) (O'Connor, J., joined by Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
391 See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983). The Court in Bearden relied on a
combination of equal protection and generic due process analysis. See id. at 664-67.
3 92 See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998).
393 The only recent possibility that this author (tongue in cheek) can call to mind would be
the abortive 1997 rebellion of the so-called "Republic of Texas," a crackpot militia group in the
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of criminal jury trial and the Article VI prohibition of any religious test for federal
office were rendered mostly superfluous by the First and Sixth Amendments. Oddly
enough, the Court in Ludwig v. Massachusetts394 cited the Article II Jury Clause
as justifying a more stringent jury requirement in federal court. Ludwig narrowly
upheld a state requirement that defendants in certain cases submit initially to a
nonbinding bench trial, while distinguishing the Court's century-old opinion in
Callan v. Wilson395-written by (who else?) the elder Justice Harlan-striking
down a similar procedure in the District of Columbia.396
The Ludwig majority argued that Callan need not be disturbed because "the
sources of the right to jury trial in the federal courts ... include [the Article M
clause,] ... which might'--might?---"be read as prohibiting, in the absence of a
defendant's consent, a federal trial without ajury .... ,,397 This was puzzling at best,
because the Sixth Amendment guarantee is in no way weaker than that of Article
H, and in fact is considerably more detailed.398 In any event, Ludwig promptly
added that the Article I[ clause "is, of course, not applicable to the States."399 This
did not follow and was not explained, but the issue seems mostly academic because
the Sixth Amendment right has, of course, been incorporated.400
Davis Mountains of West Texas. See Teas: The Alamo, Again, ECONOMIST, May 3, 1997, at 25;
ShultingDown a Siege, NEVSwVEEK, May 12,1997, at 46; Out There, TEX. MONTHLY, June 1997,
at 98.
394 427 U.S. 618 (1976).
395 127 U.S. 540 (1888).
39 6 SeeLudwig, 427 U.S. at 629-30. Cf id at 632 (Powell, J., concurring) (providing crucial
vote for Court's 5-4 decision on ground that "the right to ajury trial afforded by the Fourteenth
Amendment is not identical to that guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment"); id at 632-38
(Stevens, J., joined by Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall, JJ., dissenting) (pointing out that state's
requirement was either "totally irrational," or had impermissible purpose of "placing a burden on
the exercise of the constitutional right").
397 Id. at 629-30.
398 Compare U.S. CONST. art. 111, § 2, cl. 3 ("The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of
Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes
shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such
Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed."), with id. amend. VI ("In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy andpublic trial, by an impartial jury of
the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been
previously ascertained by law... '") (emphases added).
399 Ludwig, 427 U.S. at 630. Technically spealdng, this would thus qualify as the fourth
federal right still specifically disincorporated from the Fourteenth Amendment by the Court. Cf.
supra note 383.
4 00 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148-50 (1968).
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In Torcaso v. Watkins,40 1 the Court, in an opinion by Justice Black, found
unconstitutional a Maryland requirement that state officeholders declare a belief in
God. Because Black held that this violated freedom of religion under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments,402 he found it "unnecessary to consider [the] contention
that [the Article VI Religious Test Clause] applies to state as well as federal
offices. '403 But in light of Torcaso, that too seems academic. For most practical
purposes, both the Article VI provision and the Article III Jury Clause have, in
effect, been incorporated.
This leaves the guarantee in Article I, Section 9 against suspension of the writ
of habeas corpus. The Slaughter-House majority, back in 1873, cited this as a
federal privilege or immunity now protected against state infringement. 404 To the
extent that might be read-consistently with Cruikshank's narrowing of the right
of assembly4 5-merely to guard against state interference with the writ as handled
in federal court, such protection would be redundant given the Supremacy
Clause.40 6 Professor Crosskey suggested that the proper incorporationist reading is
that "the guaranty against suspension [of the writ is] now operative against the
states in their own courts. '407 The constitutional dimension of habeas corpus is a
complex and fascinating issue, but any further exploration of it would outrun the
scope of this article.408
Sooner or later, the present or future Supreme Court will be faced with one or
more of these leftover issues. When that happens, the "uneasy," "awkward," and
"textually untenable theory of 'selective incorporation' will "undergo
401 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
40 2 Id. at 489 & n.1, 496.
40 3 Id. at 489 n.1.
404 Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 79; see also Wildenthal, Lost Compromise, supra
note 9, at Part I.C.
40 5 See Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 551-53; Wildenthal, Lost Compromise, supra note 9, at
Part HI.C.
406 See U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2; 2 CROSSKEY, POLITICs, supra note 13, at 1129; Amar,
supra note 12, at 1258.
407 2 CROSSKEY, POLmcs, supra note 13, at 1129.
40 8 Cf, e.g., Eric M. Freedman, Milestones in Habeas Corpus, Part I-Just Because John
Marshall Said It, Doesn't Make It So: Ex Parte Bollman and the Illusory Prohibition on the
Federal Writ ofHabeas Corpusfor State Prisoners in the Judicimay Act of 1789, 51 ALA. L. REV.
531 (2000); Eric M. Freedman, Milestones in Habeas Corpus, Part II-Leo Frank Lives:
Untangling the Historical Roots of Meaningful Federal Habeas Corpus Review of State
Convictions, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1467 (2000); Eric M. Freedman, Milestones in Habeas Corpus,
Part l-Brown v. Allen: The Habeas Corpus Revolution That Wasn't, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1541
(2000); Jordan Steiker, Incorporating the Suspension Clause: Is There a Constitutional Right to
Federal Habeas Corpus For State Prisoners?, 92 MICH. L. REV. 862 (1994).
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uncomfortable scrutiny."409 Will the Court pick up where it left off in Benton more
than thirty years ago? Will it go back to first principles and resurrect the "lost
compromise" of total and textual incorporation implied by Slaughter-House and
reflected in the consensus on that issue among Republicans and Democrats in the
Congress of the early 1870s? 410
That this day of reckoning may not be far off was dramatically signalled in
1999 when the Court decided Saenz v. Roe.411 Although Saenz did not directly
implicate the incorporation issue,412 it is the Court's only extant decision to strike
down a state law-and by a lopsided seven-to-two vote-under the Fourteenth
Amendment Privileges and Immunities Clause 4 13 As if that alone were not startling
enough, the two dissenters-Justice Clarence Thomas and Chief Justice William
H. Rehnquist-suggested what may amount to an even more activist approach.
They bluntly criticized Slaughter-House for (as the conventional view would have
it) "all but read[ing] the... Clause out of the Constitution."414 Declaring that "the
demise of the... Clause has contributed in no small part to the current disarray of
our Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence," they announced themselves "open to
reevaluating its meaning in an appropriate case."415 And, they stated: "Before
invoking the Clause, . . .we should endeavor to understand what the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment thought that it meant. We should also consider whether the
Clause should displace, rather than augment, portions of our equal protection and
substantive due process jurisprudence."416
This article has sought to set the record straight regarding the Court's callous
and ill-reasoned disincorporation of almost all of the Bill of Rights between 1880
and 1908. It has, at long last, analyzed the opinions, briefs, and arguments in the
Court in a fair and comprehensive light, sympathetic to the incorporationist goals
of those who proposed the Fourteenth Amendment, and-as recounted in this
author's previous article-the incorporationist consensus briefly achieved but then
lost in the 1870s.417 That history poses a warning to the present and future Courts,
and remains an institutional debt. The twentieth-century Court-primarily the
40 9 Wildenthal, Lost Compromise, supra note 9, at 1055-56.
4 10 See id. at Parts I-m1I.A.1 and IV.
411 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
4 12 It upheld the principle of free interstate migration and equal treatment by the states of
newly migrated state citizens. See id at 503, 510-11 (striking down California law denying equal
welfare benefits to recent migrants).
4 13 See Wildenthal, Lost Compromise, supra note 9, at Parts L.A and II.A. See generally
Tribe, Saenz, supra note 13.
4 14 Saenz, 526 U.S. at 521 (Thomas, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
4 15 Id. at 528 (Thomas, J.,joined by Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
4 16 Id
417 See generally Wildenthal, Lost Compromise, supra note 9.
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Warren Court during the eight short years from 1961 to 1969-paid off much of
that historical debt by restoring most Bill of Rights guarantees to their rightful
protected place in the Fourteenth Amendment. The present and future Courts should
be mindful of that history, and that debt, in construing the Constitution for the
twenty-first century and beyond.
